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ABST RACT 
 
This dissertation explores the principle of supremacy that has long created tensions between 
the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional courts. The relevant general 
principles of the international law and the supranational nature of the European Community 
are also addressed in order to reflect on the evolution of the case law of the European Court of 
Justice on the principle of supremacy. Apart from the monist approach of the ECJ claiming 
the supremacy of EC Law over the conflicting national rules, the perspectives of the national 
courts are also analysed with a particular emphasis on the German Constitutional Court due to 
its rich body of case-law on the principle of supremacy. This dissertation later focuses on the 
problems posed by enlargement of the European Union to the recent Central and Eastern 
European Countries by citing the recent important judgments. The methods will be proposed 
to overcome the clash between the two national systems. The Treaty establishing the 
Constitution for Europe with its innovations particularly the mechanisms enabling the 
Community to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights is suggested as the 
leading alternative way to ease the clash between the two legal systems. 
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Ö ZE T 
 
Bu tez çalışması Avrupa Topluluğu Adalet Divanı ve anayasa mahkemeleri başta olmak üzere 
Üye Ülkelerin ulusal mahkemeleri arasında tartışmaya neden olan Avrupa hukukunun 
üstünlüğü prensibini Avrupa Topluluğu Hukuku ve ulusal hukuk düzenleri çerçevesinde ele 
almaktadır. Avrupa Adalet Divanı’nın üstünlük prensibi konusundaki içtihatının gelişimini 
yansıtmak için uluslararası hukukun genel prensipleri ve Avrupa Topluluğu’nun uluslarüstü 
yapısı da ele alınmaktadır. Avrupa Adalet Divanı’nın ve Ulusal Mahkemelerin özellikle bu 
konuda geniş içtihata sahip olan Alman Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Avrupa hukukunun üye 
devletler hukuku üzerindeki üsütünlüğü hakkında yaklaşımlarına yer verilmektedir. Bu tez 
çalışması daha sonra Merkez ve Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri genişleme süreciyle birlikte konu ile 
ilgili ortaya çıkan sorunları irdelemekte, çeşitli çözüm önerileri sunmaktadır. Özellikle 
Avrupa İnsan Hakları Konvansiyonuna Topluluğun katılımı yönünde getirdiği 
mekanizmalarla, Avrupa Anayasasını kuran Antlaşma öne çıkan bir çözüm önerisi olarak 
ortaya konulmaktadır. 
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 I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
Compared to the inherent weaknesses of the other forms of international law and international 
courts in enforcement issues, the legal system that the European Union (hereinafter: the EU) 
has established can be described as one of the most effective and sophisticated legal systems 
in existence. In other international legal systems, a limited number of cases are heard in the 
courts and there are not sufficient enforcement procedures in case of violations of member 
states. Instead, the majority of the legal disputes are solved outside of those international legal 
mechanisms.  
 
Contrary to this, the European legal system works almost like a national legal system where 
the violations are brought before the European Court of Justice (hereinafter: the ECJ) under 
the unique enforcement procedure and there is also exceptional influence of the judgments of 
the ECJ on the national systems. This system was not that effective in the early days of the 
Communities and it has been transformed through bold legal interpretations of the ECJ since 
1950s and 60s. 
 
One of these bold interpretations of the ECJ which has formed the European Community law 
(hereinafter: EC Law) as it is today is the principle of supremacy. This principle has no legal 
basis in the EC Treaty1. However, it is rather a result of teleological (purposive) interpretation 
of the ECJ in order to give full effectiveness to Treaty provisions with an aim of creating the 
common market. Following the ruling of the Court in Van Gend en Loos case2, the ECJ 
developed this doctrine in the light of the “new legal order of international law” which was 
                                                 
1 The Treaty of Nice is signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003. By the Treaty of 
Nice, the former Treaty of the EU and the Treaty of the EC have been merged into one consolidated version. 
2 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, [1963] ECR 1. 
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 created by the establishment of European Communities. Later, the doctrine of supremacy of 
EC Law over the national laws of Member States has been reiterated by the ECJ. However, 
the different approaches pursued by the national courts and by the ECJ have often led to 
controversial judgments which paved the way for clash between two legal systems. The 
national courts base their claims on their Constitutions whereas the ECJ asserts that it is EC 
Law that decides for the matters under the competence of the Community and it has 
precedence over the national law. This may be the case where a Community legislative act, 
for example, is found to be contrary to a fundamental right protected under the constitution of 
a Member State.  
 
Despite the monist approach of the ECJ (i.e. EC law takes precedence over national law), 
most of the Member States’ national courts particularly the German Constitutional Court 
(hereinafter: BVerfG, the Bundesverfassungsgericht) assert that they have created the 
Community law based on their national legal systems and empowered the Court by their own 
constitutions. Thus, the authority that is attributed to the ECJ does not come from the EC as a 
sovereign entity but from their national legal systems. The natural conclusion of this approach 
is that national law takes precedence over EC law. Some Member States have been quite 
vocal concerning the principle of supremacy. The BVerfG claimed in its early decisions that 
in many respects the German Basic Law and German legal system are much more 
sophisticated in protecting fundamental rights than the EC legal system. This has resulted in 
the rulings before the national courts putting reservations to the ECJ’s claim of supremacy 
and reclaim of their sovereign rights in protecting fundamental rights of their citizens. 
However, it is possible to claim that as a result of mutual understanding, Germany now has 
come to the point of embracing the idea that EC legal system is sufficient enough to protect 
fundamental freedoms as the BVerfG. This mutual understanding has developed owing to 
 10
 consensus in many areas. The inclusion of European Charter of Fundamental Rights into the 
European Constitution especially in the section of economic rights by efforts of Germany is 
illustrative of the fact that at political level there have been many efforts to bring Germany 
into lines that it is now. 
 
However, after the accession of the ten new Member States, constitutional problems have 
emerged in some of these countries which demonstrate the practical difficulties of aligning the 
national legal systems with EC Law. These legal systems are established on the experiences 
of the previous communist regimes and therefore, while setting up their new system in order 
to avoid the repetition of the past, the protection of fundamental rights and other national 
concepts of constitutionalism became a vital part of their systems. These concerns of national 
sovereignty and independence are also apparent in their accession debates. During the 
negotiations, certain references were made to the Solange I3 and Solange II4 cases and certain 
derogations were sought regarding supremacy of EC Law.5 Yet in many instances, “European 
Clauses” were adopted in favour of the supremacy of EC Law. For instance, the Article 91(3) 
of Polish Constitution6 states that “if an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, 
establishing an international organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be 
applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws.” 
 
However, in practice, this acceptance may not mean a lot. In some other cases, such as in 
Hungary, these accession amendments on purpose avoided to take a stand regarding the 
supremacy of EC Law although government’s official declaration states that in case of 
                                                 
3 Case Solange I, 37 BVerfGE 271, English translation [1974] 2 CMLR 540 - Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Hereinafter: Solange I) case  
4 Case Solange II, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 CMLR 225 - the application of Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft 
(Hereinafter: Solange II), pp. 375. 
5 András Sajó, “Learning Co-operative Constitutionalism the Hard Way: The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
Shying Away from EU Supremacy” ZSE 3/2004, pp. 353. 
6 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland [online] availale from 
http://bib.sejm.gov.pl/tek/txt/kpol/eng/kon1.html; Internet: Accessed on 28.05.2006. 
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 conflict of laws, national courts must give precedence to EC Law.7 The recent ruling of 
Hungarian Constitutional Court revealed this tension between the national supreme courts and 
the ECJ. 
 
This dissertation adopts an inductive methodology whereby instead of depicting the picture 
with the use of the grand legal theories, it tries to reach the conclusion through addressing the 
different positions taken on the issue of supremacy of EC Law and attempts to give an 
account to the inner workings of the Community system and its interaction with the national 
legal systems. Therefore, it focuses on what happened and is happening in practice in the 
application of EC Law by the national courts and in the reaction of the ECJ to this 
implementation. However, this dissertation later will turn to the theoretical debate and discuss 
the implications of the Constitutional Treaty briefly and its impact on the supremacy debate. 
 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. The first chapter will focus on the development 
of the concept of supremacy of EC Law and try to contrast the unique approach of the ECJ to 
principles under the international law. The basic constitutional principles of the EC legal 
system will be analysed concurrently. In this chapter, a brief historical background of how 
and why the ECJ has developed the principle of supremacy in this way will be tackled 
through the evolution of its case-law.  
 
In the second chapter, the perspectives of the national legal systems of Member States 
particularly the German legal system to the supremacy issue will be scrutinized. The monist 
and the dualist national legal systems will be briefly described. A particular emphasis will be 
                                                 
7 Sajó, supra note 5, pp. 354. 
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 given to German cases such as the Solange I, the Solange II due to the rich body of case-law 
that it has in order to exemplify for the clash between the ECJ and the national legal systems. 
 
The third chapter will deal with the problem that is posed with the new enlargement and the 
impact of legacy of the authoritarian regimes on the newly acceded countries. Two of the new 
Member States, Poland and Hungary are chosen for the following reasons. First for the 
purposes of this dissertation citing all the relevant but similar cases from new Member States 
would not be possible due to the limitations in space. These countries and the corresponding 
national cases are chosen to be representative of the all new Member States having those 
authoritarian regimes.  Moreover, from the perspective of their accession negotiation debates 
and the process of adoption of European clauses, they constitute somewhat two contrasts: 
while Poland was more benign in accepting the European clause, Hungary sidestepped the 
issue. Nevertheless, for the issue of supremacy of EC Law they took a similar stand at the 
end. Finally another German case, Darkazanli case8 will finalize the chapter in order to 
demonstrate the debate is still vivid even in Germany, a Member State that is thought settled 
the debate. The implications on the problem of the relationship between EC law and German 
constitutional law will be analysed. 
 
The fourth chapter will turn back to the theoretical debate on the doctrine of supremacy 
briefly and suggest certain methods to overcome the clash between the ECJ and the national 
courts on the issue such as the principle of consistent interpretation of EC Law, public 
international law and European Constitutionalism. 
 
                                                 
8 BVerfG, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), 58 (2005), 2289 (Hereinafter: Darkazanli case) that was 
preceeded by an interim measure stopping complainant’s extradition BVerfG, Europäische Grundrechte 
Zeitschrift, 32 (2005), 667. 
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 The final chapter will concentrate on the Constitutional Treaty as a panacea to the debate with 
its innovations in several areas ranging from the mechanisms aiming at decreasing the 
democratic deficit, improvement of level of protection of fundamental rights through the 
inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental rights, simplifying of the decision-making 
procedures, clarifying the competences of the Community. 
 
The conclusion is based on the fact that there may not be legal consensus among the national 
courts on the issue of supremacy of EC Law. Although mutual understanding can be reached 
overtime as in the case of the BVerfG this settlement may be accepted as illusionary as the 
new issues are coming under the competences of the Community. This is also the case for 
newly acceded Member States such as Poland and Hungary. Their authoritarian past shaped 
their newly established systems as more protectionist especially concerning fundamental 
rights. There are certain methods such as the principle of consistent interpretation of EC Law, 
public international law and European Constitutionalism. However in some respects there 
methods fall short of providing a satisfactory solution to the debate. Rather a political 
consensus will be needed at the European level. The Constitutional Treaty provides a 
favourable framework for the realisation of this political consensus through its innovative 
contributions such as the mechanisms it introduces to provide the assurance that the 
Community system is adequately sophisticated to give effective protection to the fundamental 
rights of European citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 14
 CHAPTE R I  
 THE EVOLUTION:  THE PRI NCIP LE OF S UPREM ACY OF EC 
LAW 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The relation of national legal systems to the legal order of the European Union brings about 
interesting questions regarding the general principles to be used in case of conflict between 
the two systems. As many other systems of law, EC Law has an evolving structure and some 
of its general principles explaining its relation vis-à-vis national laws have been developed 
overtime in the light of the objectives of EC Treaty.  
 
The legitimacy of the judicial process is essential for the existence of established legal bodies 
and for the respect for law. However, as in the case of most international legal systems, the 
European legal system had long suffered the weakness of its enforcement mechanisms and the 
poor compliance of the Member States. In the 1960s, there was a problem of compliance to 
the Treaty of Rome. There were numerous exceptions and violations of EC Law where the 
individual Member States were trying to protect their own market and to secure advantages 
for their workers and producers. Besides, the Member States were themselves violating EC 
Law by retaining the conflicting national rules. With the target of the EEC Treaty to establish 
the common market by the year 1970, the ECJ had become one of the most influential driving 
forces of European Integration by establishing its own principles in a context where the legal 
system of the EC was not properly functioning. Under the Community legal system 
established by the Treaty of Rome, only the Member States and the Commission could bring 
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 lawsuit against the violations of EC Law before the ECJ. Member States were reluctant to 
bring an action against another state while the Commission preferred the problem to be solved 
without going to the Court. The only thing that the ECJ could do is to declare that a Member 
State has failed to fulfil its obligations. This method is not usually welcomed as it could be 
counter-productive due to its coercive nature.9 Thus, the lack of effective enforcement 
mechanisms enforced the ECJ to develop its own general principles to fill out the legal 
lacuna. The principle of direct effect and the principle consistent interpretation of national law 
in the light of EC law are among those principles in order to bring more effective enforcement 
mechanism to the EC legal system. As a result of the application of those principles by the 
national courts, the effect of EC law in the national legal systems is governed according to the 
principle of supremacy of EC law over the conflicting national rules. 
 
The principle of supremacy offers a solution to an uneasy question that may result from the 
concurrent existence of two legal systems: which legal order takes precedence when a conflict 
arises between the ECJ and national courts. The clash occurs usually when a provision of EC 
Law confers rights and imposes duties directly upon European citizens (i.e. direct effect of EC 
law) while it conflicts with a national rule. As in the case of direct effect doctrine, the doctrine 
of supremacy of EC Law is not expressly contained in any of the founding Treaties. Therefore 
it has no clear legal basis in the EC Treaty, although, maybe it would have been settled by the 
Treaty on the Constitution for Europe, where it was defined in art. I-6, had the Constitution 
not been rejected by the French and the Dutch referenda.10
 
                                                 
9 Karen J. Alter, “The Transformation of the European Law System and the Rule of Law in Europe,” 
Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe, (Oxford: 
University Press Oxford, 2001) pp. 217-218. 
10 Franz C. Mayer, “Supremacy Lost? Comment on Roman Kwiecien,” German Law Review (2005) Vol. 06 No. 
11 pp. 1499. 
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 It is the aim of this chapter to present the evolution of the principle of supremacy as a result of 
teleological (purposive) interpretation of the ECJ in order to give full effect to Treaty 
provisions especially to those provisions that have an aim of creating a common market. 
Apart from this primary source of EC Law (Treaty provisions), the effect of secondary 
sources of EC Law particularly regulations will be analysed within the case law. The 
approach and the reasoning of the ECJ on the supremacy principle are defined by citing the 
landmark cases in this area.  
 
This chapter follows a three-fold structure. The first section begins with a very brief overview 
of the historical background of the EC, its main objectives, its institutional structure, its 
decision-making instruments and its powers (i.e. competences) vis-à-vis the sovereign powers 
of the Member States. The second section deals with the general principles of international 
law to shed some light to the distinction between international law and EC law. The third part 
turns to the principal discussion on the evolution of the principle of supremacy in the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
 
 
2. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS CONCERNING THE EC LEGAL ORDER 
 
The end of the Second World War marked to an era that witnessed the appearance of several 
economic integration formations throughout the world with varying intensity and at different 
speed of progress. Europe was not an exception. The European integration process began with 
the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951, by which, the European Coal and Steel Community 
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 (ECSC) was formed11 with a view to pooling together the resources of Europe and 
establishing a common market for coal and steel (two vital sectors in Europe due to their 
military application). Within this organization, the Member States gave substantial decision-
making powers to the “High Authority” (i.e. the supranational institution of the ECSC) for the 
specific arrangements in this particular economic area (i.e. setting the market prices without 
import or export duties or subsidies). The success realised in this sectoral integration 
subsequently gave an inspiration for the formation of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) by the signing of Treaties 
of Rome in 195712. In 1960s, the founding father of the European Community, Jean Monnet 
commented on the European Integration: 
 
“European Unity is the most important event in the West since the war, not 
because it is a new great power, but because the new institutional method it 
introduces is permanently modifying relations between nations and men. 
Human nature does not change, but when nations and men accept the same rule 
and the same institutions to make sure that they are applied, their behaviour 
towards each other changes. This is the process of civilization itself.” 13
 
In other words, the impetus for further European integration brought a new understanding of 
the concept nation state, the rule and the institutions in Europe. The supranational character of 
these organizations is a striking feature in the post Second World War Europe and 
differentiates these types of organizations from international organizations since the member 
                                                 
11 The founding members of the ECSC are France, West Germany (i.e. East Germany and West Germany 
reunified in 1989), Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
12 The above mentioned developments resulted in the formation of the European Communities (EC) by signing 
of the Merger Treaty in 1967. The Treaty entered into force in 1969 and although the three Communities 
continued to exist, their executive structure became unique. In 1968, the original six founding members 
accomplished the “Customs Union” among themselves.  
13 Jean Monnet, “A Ferment of Change” Journal of Common Market Studies, 1(1)(1962) 203-211. 
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 states of these organisations began to give some parts of their sovereignty in the areas 
regulated by these organisations.  
 
Among the there Communities, the EEC (later renamed “the European Community” by the 
Maastricht Treaty14) is the most important one that formed the nucleus of the European 
Union. Modelled from the High Authority of the ECSC, under the EEC several institutions 
were established in order to ensure the realization of the tasks and activities that are 
substantiated in Article 2 and Article 3 of the EC Treaty (i.e. “establishing a common market 
and economic and monetary union” and “implementing common policies and activities” of 
the Community)  
 
In order to implement these objectives specified under the EC Treaty (as a primary source15 
of EC Law) various decision-making instruments were invented as secondary sources of EC 
Law. Under the terms of Article 249 EC several forms of binding and non-binding secondary 
legislation have been specified. The regulations are binding and “directly applicable” within 
all Member States without any need for subsequent adoption of a national act for their 
transposition. Therefore as a result of their direct applicability the regulations become a part 
of national legal systems automatically. It is possible that Member States need to amend their 
national law in order to comply with the norms of the regulation. Thus, it is possible to rank 
them between primary sources and secondary of EC law. As it will be seen this nature and 
ranking of the regulations is the main reason of the clash between the EC and the national 
legal systems that is stemming from the EC secondary legislation. The directives provide 
more a flexible form of legal instrument. They differ from the regulation in two aspects. First, 
                                                 
14 Treaty on European Union (consolidated text) Official Journal C 325 of 24 December 2002
15 The Treaties establishing the European Communities and the Treaties amending them form the primary 
sources of EC Law. They are the ECSC Treaty, the Treaties of Rome establishing the EEC and EURATOM, the 
Merger Treaty, the Single European Act, the Treaty of Maastricht, Treaty of Amsterdam and Treaty of Nice as 
well as the Accession Treaties of the new Member States. 
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 although they address to the Member States, this does not have to cover all Member States 
and are only binding as to the result to be achieved. The directives set a specific date for their 
adoption and in the meantime Member States choose the form and the method for their 
transposition into their national systems. The decisions are also binding in their entirety for 
the person or entity they address. Recommendations and opinions are non-binding legal 
instruments.16  
 
Having established the main decision-making instruments within the EC legal system it is 
now time to define the powers assigned to EC law to issue these legal acts and regulate policy 
areas because the debate concerning supremacy of EC law revolves around the competences 
of the EC and the Member States. This is the question that is going to be dealt in this 
dissertation concerning who is the final arbiter in deciding the constitutionality rules of EC 
law. For most of the policy areas, the Member States and the EC have “shared competences” 
rather than exclusive competence of the EC. The EC have an “expressed internal competence” 
where the legal basis provided under the EC Treaty which allows the Community to take an 
action to regulate affairs internally on behalf of the Member States and an “expressed external 
competence” to act internationally on behalf of Member States.17 Other than those expressed 
policy areas under the Treaty, there is also implied competence of the EC internally and 
externally. The reason of implied powers is “the existence of a given power implies also the 
existence of any other power which is reasonably necessary for the exercise of the former”18 
It is possible that implied external competence can be shared between the Member States and 
the Community or it can be exclusive as well. In ERTA case19, the ECJ declared the concept 
                                                 
16 Paul Craig and Gràinne De Búrca, EC Law Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 113-
117. 
17 Such as Article 133 regulating the Common Commercial Policy. 
18 Trevor.C Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford University Press, 4th edn.,1998), 
pp. 102. 
19 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1976] ECR 263 para. 16-17. 
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 of exclusive competence of the Community: whenever the Community adopts provision for a 
specific common policy, the Member States no longer have the right to undertake an external 
action in that area. In other words if the EC occupies the field internally it has also exclusive 
competence externally in order to ensure the unity of the Common Market and the uniform 
application of Community law.20  
 
As a result if the Community enacts a legislative measure in a particular policy area, the 
Member States are barred from taking individual action to regulate those areas. Otherwise 
they are considered in breach of their obligations under the EC Treaty. As to the debate on 
supremacy, for instance, they cannot use the existence of its national legislation as a ground to 
claim that a Community measure breaches its national law as there should not be a conflicting 
national legislation in the first place. The point is tricky when it comes to the regulations that 
enters into force right after their promulgation and automatically become the part of national 
legislation. 
 
In such areas which do not fall under the exclusive competence of the Community, the 
subsidiarity is the guiding principle which restricts the Community to use its powers in a non-
proportional way. Under the terms of Article 5 of the EC Treaty, the Community acts “only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by the reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community.” The clash arises from the fact that the Community 
legislation contradicts with important national values or the act of the institution overreaches 
its limits and violates the principle of proportionality.21  
 
                                                 
20 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 122-132. 
21 Theodor Schilling, Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle, or:Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, [online]; available 
from http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/95/9510ind.html#IVC Internet: Accessed on 03.06.2006. 
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 The main reason of this debate is that the delegation of competences between the Member 
States and the EC is not clearly defined under the Treaty as a catalogue. To the contrary, the 
competences are defined not in view of a specific field of legislation but to achieve certain 
objectives (enumerated in Article 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty). This simply means that in the 
Community law, the principle of supremacy functions according to the case-law of the ECJ 
without any restriction imposed on its interpretation. 22
 
3. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EC LAW 
 
 
Having briefly examined the EC legal system, it is of use to elucidate the difference between 
EC Law and the public international law. The public international law, or commonly used as 
international law is the “body of law regulating the activities of entities having international 
personality”23. States and international organizations are subject to the rules of international 
law. EC Law, however, has evolved into a different form than international law in regulating 
the “activities” of its Member States since the EC is itself a supranational organization, not a 
mere international organization and certain “activities” of its Member States are attributed to 
the competence of the EC as it was described in the section above. Due to these peculiarities 
of the EC system, the case law of the ECJ evolved accordingly.  
 
When EC Law was introduced in 1950s, there was insignificant difference in the way the 
national courts considered and ruled on cases consisting public international law and EC law 
considerations. As a whole, the national courts received all rules of international law 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 The definition of international law [online]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law 
Internet: Accessed on 03.06.2006. 
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 regardless of whether it is the international law or EC law according to the same general 
principles of international law. 
 
In this context, the basic principle is pacta sunt servanda which denotes that once signed the 
treaties must be observed in good faith. Moreover, the customary international law as it was 
codified in 1969 under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties24 stipulates in Article 
27 that “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty.” However, the doctrine of invocability of treaties in national courts as it is 
established by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) Danzig case25 was an 
undeveloped principle. Enforcement of international law is also limited in cases where the 
executive and legislative bodies of the State acted contrary to international law. These are 
dealt at international level except certain matters such as jurisdiction and immunities matters. 
In other words, the national courts are not influential in application and development of 
international law.26
 
However, this is not the case for the relationship between EC Law and the national laws27 
since this unique relation has been defined by the ECJ in a quite different way as the next 
section of the chapter attempts to demonstrate. The turning point is the ruling of the ECJ in 
Van Gend en Loos case28 where EC law was differentiated from other ordinary international 
treaties and national courts are placed at the heart of enforcement of EC law through direct 
                                                 
24 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, pp. 331. 
25 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, 1928 PCIJ Series B, No.15., pp.17-18. 
26 Geritt Betlem and André Nollkaemper, “Giving Effect to Public International Law and European Community 
Law before domestic courts. A comparative analysis of the practice of consistent interpretation” EJIL (2003), 
Vol. 14 No.3, pp. 570-571. 
27 Roman Kwiecień, “ The Supremacy of European Union Law over National Law Under the Constitutional 
Treaty” German Law Review (2005) Vol. 06 No.11 pp. 1487. 
28 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, supra note 2.  
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 effect of Treaty articles. Another important judgment is the case Costa v. ENEL29 where the 
ECJ substantiated the features of this new legal order by establishing that EC law has 
precedence over national rules in the event of conflict. There are two mechanisms deployed 
by the national courts in the Community legal system to ensure that EC law is effectively 
applied: the direct effect and principle of consistent interpretation. 
 
The major difference between EC law and the international law indeed lies on these 
sophisticated and sometimes authoritative enforcement mechanisms of EC law. The direct 
effect entails and permits a national court to apply a rule of EC law as an “independent rule of 
decision in the national legal order” in cases that rule of EC law is not transposed or not 
transposed in full. When a rule of EC law is granted direct effect and invoked before the 
Courts of Member States, it is the autonomous basis of the court’s decision (i.e. autonomous 
than national legal system). The EC legal system also has an authoritative notion of principle 
of consistent interpretation (which is also known as indirect effect). In the context of principle 
of consistent interpretation a rule of EC law is used to construe a rule of national law in the 
light of EC law. Under EC law, national courts are obliged to do so. In Von Colson case30, the 
ECJ ruled that “all the authorities of the Member States” including courts must “interpret and 
apply the legislation adopted for the implementation of the directive in conformity with the 
requirements of Community law” in order to realise the objectives of Article 246 EC. The 
ECJ elaborated the principle of consistent interpretation in Marleasing case31 and ruled that 
“in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the 
directive, the national court called upon to interpret is required to do so, as far as possible, in 
the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive…” As a result this brings an 
                                                 
29 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 
30 Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann, [1984] ECR 1891, para. 26 -28. 
31 Case C-106/89, Marleasing, [1990] ECR I-4135. 
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 enforcement of EC law beyond the general principle lex posterior derogat legi priori of 
international law. 
 
As a result, it is EC law not the national law that determines the effect of a rule of EC law 
within national legal systems. This is dictated by the ultimate objective that EC law is applied 
uniformly throughout the Community. On the other hand, the international law is silent about 
the validity and the effects of international law in national legal system. Thus, the effect of a 
rule of international law is determined by national law, not international law. Here depending 
on whether states have monist and dualist legal systems, this effect of international law is 
defined. For the monist systems it is possible to divide the international rights and obligations 
from national legal order and prevent their organs (national courts or other administrative 
bodies) from applying the rules of international law that is not become a part of national law 
yet. Therefore, the effect of international law depends on prior decision of states declaring 
their acceptance of the validity of international law.32  
 
It is possible to conclude that these unique characteristics of EC law exist in international law 
too but in a less sophisticated and effective manner. As Charles Leben stated “Community 
law is ‘successful international law’, and …is thus a possible horizon of international law, 
indicating the route that international law must follow if it is to move forward.”33 The 
following section of this chapter illuminates the evolution of the case law of the ECJ on the 
matter of supremacy where this principle under international law is far less developed than 
EC law as it shall be seen below. 
 
                                                 
32 Betlem and Nollkaemper, supra note 26, pp. 571-573. 
33 Charles Leben, “Hans Kelsen and the Advancement of International Law”, 9 EJIL (1998) pp. 298. 
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 4.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE CASE-LAW OF THE ECJ 
 
4.1  Van Gend en Loos 
 
A standard overview of the evolution of the case law of the ECJ on supremacy has to begin 
with a case of 1963, Van Gend en Loos34 which is also one of the landmark cases that 
underpins the very foundations of EC Law. With this judgment, the ECJ spelled out for the 
first time that with the establishment of European Communities a “new legal order of 
international law” was created.  
 
Van Gend en Loos is a Dutch transport company and it brought a case before the national 
court against the Dutch customs authorities, who had charged the company with increased 
amount of custom duties on a product it was importing from the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The ECJ mainly analyzed the question whether individuals too can rely on Article 
25 (ex Article 12) which clearly prohibits the introduction of new custom duties and increase 
of existing ones in the common market. 
 
According to the observations submitted of the Belgian government35 the ECJ could not 
answer the first question as the issue was of constitutional character and fell exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the Dutch court.36 The Belgian government indicated that: 
 
That court is confronted with two international treaties both of which are part 
of the national law. It must decide under national law- assuming that they are 
                                                 
34 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, supra note 2. 
35 It is possbile for other Member States to submit observations for the cases before the ECJ if the matter is of 
their interest in order to influence the final judgment by making their point clear. 
36 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, supra note 2, pp. 6. 
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 in fact contradictory- which treaty prevails over the other or more exactly 
whether a prior national law of ratification prevails over a subsequent one. 
 
This is a typical question of national constitutional law which has nothing to do 
with the interpretation of an Article of the EEC Treaty and within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Netherlands court, because it can only be answered 
according to the constitutional principles and jurisprudence of the national law 
of the Netherlands. 
 
The ECJ ruled that establishing a “Common Market” is the aim of the EEC Treaty and the 
functioning of this “Common Market” is of direct concern to the interested parties in the 
Community. According to the ECJ, this shows that the Treaty is more than an agreement 
which merely creates mutual obligations to the signatory states. The ECJ continued by giving 
one of the most outstanding statements in its case-law which have been repeated several times 
in subsequent cases. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new 
legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which 
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
 
As it can be seen from the judgment of the Court, EC Law is not an ordinary international 
legal system. Instead, the new legal order of international law has been created by the 
Member States who limited their sovereign rights in their respective territories on certain 
issues such as determination of custom duties and charges. That means that the provisions of 
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 the Treaty regulating those matters, in this case Article 25 (ex Article 12), have supremacy 
over conflicting national law meaning that Member States cannot retain in force such national 
measures conflicting with EC law. Therefore, such conflicting national measures should be 
repealed from the national law subsequently. In Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ sidestepped the 
question of which law prevails over the other by simply emphasizing that European law 
should be distinguished from regular public international law. Having recognized the 
principle of direct effect of Treaty provisions, the possibility of conflict has been accepted by 
the Court. The ECJ in 1963 in the Costa v. ENEL37 further clarified its stand on the issue of 
supremacy that EC Law prevails.38
     
4.2       Costa v. ENEL 
 
Costa v. ENEL is the first case where the ECJ spelled out the principle of supremacy of EC 
law. The facts of the case are straightforward. An Italian citizen brought a case to the national 
court alleging that it was contrary to the EC Treaty to charge fees by Italian national energy 
company. Italian government asserts that the preliminary ruling question of Giudice 
Conciliatore (the national court) is “absolutely inadmissible” since as a national court it 
cannot avail itself of Article 177 (the preliminary ruling procedure) but it has to apply national 
law.39  
 
As the EC Treaty does not directly state that EC Law has precedence in case of conflict with 
national law, the theoretical underpinnings of the principle of supremacy were enumerated in 
the ruling of the ECJ as follows. 
 
                                                 
37 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, supra note 29. 
38 Mayer, supra note 10, pp. 1497. 
39 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, supra note 29, para 8. 
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 As the first reason, the ECJ repeated its judgment in Van Gend en Loos that differing from 
other international treaties the EEC has created its own legal system which became “an 
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to 
apply.”40 In its reasoning in Costa v. ENEL the ECJ felt the necessity to distinguish between 
the Community Law and the public international law so that the Member States whose 
national legal systems require further national legislative act for the transposition of the 
international law would effectively recognize the supremacy of Community Law in their own 
national legal order. This pragmatic reasoning together with the principle of direct effect aims 
to give effectiveness to the EC Treaty.41
 
The second reason (directly related to the first one) focuses on the limitation of sovereignty of 
the Member States. The ECJ stated that Member States established a “Community of 
unlimited duration”, with its institutions, its own legal personality, its own legal capacity and 
the capacity to represent them in the international arena. More importantly, Member States 
did so by delegating real powers and by limiting their sovereignty to the Community. The 
ECJ did not make any reference to the constitutions of Member States to show attribution of 
powers and limitation of sovereignty.42 As it is explained above, in the areas that falls under 
the exclusive competence of the Community, only the EC has right to legislate internally and 
this internal exclusive competence implies the external competence of the EC. 
 
The third reason for the supremacy of EC Law is that the resultant body of law of Community 
binds both the nationals and the Member States themselves. With this integration of 
provisions derived from the Community law into the laws of each Member State and 
                                                 
40 Ibid. para 9. 
41 Jan Wouters, “National Constitutions and the European Union”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration (LIEI) 
27/2000,  pp. 42 where a reference was made to B. De Witte, ‘ “Retour à Costa”. La primauté du droit 
communautaire à la luminère du droit international’ Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (1984), pp. 425. 
42 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, supra note 29, para. 10. 
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 according to the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, it is impossible for Member States to give 
the precedence to a national and another subsequent measure over European legal system. The 
“spirit of the Treaty” dictates to give full effectiveness to the Community legal system which 
Member States have accepted on the basis of reciprocity. This means that if one of the 
Member States tries to evade from its obligations under the Treaty based on its national legal 
system, other Member States who agree the same terms under Treaty and abide by their 
obligations would be in disadvantaged position. The existence of free riders without the 
principle of reciprocity of international law has a substantial potential to make the European 
integration project futile. When it comes to the aims of the Treaty, the obligations undertaken 
under the EC Treaty (towards integration and co-operation) would be deprived of their 
effectiveness if they can be called into question by the national legislations and interpreted 
differently under each national system. This reasoning is one of the first examples of the 
pragmatic and purposive (teleological) interpretation of the Treaty by the ECJ to secure the 
uniformity and the effectiveness of Community law.43  
 
The fourth reason is explained by the ECJ with textual evidence. The Court stressed the fact 
that existence of Article 189 (now Article 249) proves the precedence of EC Law. Article 189 
states that regulations are “legally binding” and “directly applicable in all Member States.”44 
For the regulations to be qualified as unconditional acts as indicated in the article, they cannot 
be subject to national legislative acts. However, this explanation is rather weak because it 
only refers one sort of legislative act, namely the regulations and not inclusive to other types 
of legislation of EC law as a whole. 
 
                                                 
43 Ibid., para. 11-12. 
44 Ibid., para. 13. 
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 It is possible to conclude that the conceptual basis for this principle was established in Van 
Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL.45 The first two theoretical reasonings of the ECJ in Costa 
v. ENEL are more open to debate than the last two practical explanations where the Court has 
used the purposive approach to establish the concept of supremacy of EC law reflecting the 
two major objectives: the uniform application of Community law throughout the Union and 
preservation of the effectiveness of EC Law. In the first two underpinnings the ECJ relied 
upon several premises such as Community law creating its ‘own legal system’, the 
‘permanent’ or ‘definitive limitation’46 of sovereign powers of the Member States in certain 
areas, the Community law as an ‘independent source of law’ and ‘its special and original 
nature’. After Costa v. ENEL the ECJ never further contemplated on these theoretical 
foundations. In following cases such as Francovich47 the supremacy principle was taken for 
granted and it was used as a veiled theoretical background for the establishment of other 
principles stretching the principle from the duty of national courts to set aside the conflicting 
national law to the doctrine of State liability.  
 
4.3       Internationale Handelsgesellschaft  
 
The case concerns the validity of export licenses and of the deposit system attached to it as the 
system established by the Council Regulation48 in question runs contrary to certain 
fundamental principles of German Basic Law, in particular the principles of freedom of action 
and disposition, of economic liberty and of proportionality.49   
 
                                                 
45 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 278-279. 
46 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, supra note 29, para. 9. 
47 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich et al v. Italy [1991] ECR I-5337 para. 31-36. 
48 Council Regulation No. 120/67/EEC of the Council of 13 June 1967 on the common organization of the 
market in cereals (OJ Special Edition 1967, pp. 33). Another related legislation is Regulation No 473/67/EEC of 
the Commission of 21 August 1967 on import and export licences (OJ 1967, No 204, pp. 16) 
49 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para. 1-2. 
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 The ECJ ruled that the uniformity and the efficacy of Community law would have been 
adversely affected if the validity of the acts of the Community institutions is reviewed through 
the recourse to the national rules. It is not relevant whether the national law at issue has 
constitutional character or not. The legal status of a conflicting national law was not relevant 
to the question whether Community Law should take precedence. The ECJ stressed that; 
 
In fact, the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, 
cannot be overridden by the rules of national law without being deprived of its 
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community 
itself being called into question.50
 
Thus, the ECJ once again asserted the supremacy of this time directly applicable EC Law. In 
Costa v. ENEL the contested measure was considered to be contrary to Treaty Articles such as 
Article 102, Article 93, Article 53 and Article 37.51 The crucial point is the automatic 
application of regulations into the legal systems of the Member States. This time the national 
measure at issue was a fundamental rule protected under the national constitution. It is not 
only the provisions of the national constitutions but also administrative acts even having a 
minor importance are considered under the principle of supremacy of EC law.52
 
 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft marked the beginning of the very controversial debate 
between the BVerfG and the ECJ. In each case the ECJ asserted the supremacy of EC Law by 
avoiding direct conflict with national courts.53 The national dimension of the conflict between 
the ECJ and the BVerfG will be explained in the second chapter. 
                                                 
50 Ibid., supra note 50, para. 3. 
51 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, supra note 29. 
52 Case C-224/97, Ciola v. Land Vorarberg [1994] ECR I-2517, para. 24.  
53 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp.280. 
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4.4     Simmenthal 
 
The Simmenthal case54 is one of the landmark cases which tackled the question whether the 
conflicting national law must be set aside readily without waiting until it was abolished by the 
relevant constitutional authority. Simmenthal SpA was a company which brought an action 
before Pretore claiming that it was not compatible with EC Law for Italy to retain national 
laws requiring charges for veterinary and public health inspections on its imports of beef from 
France into Italy.55 The ECJ held that the pecuniary charges in question in fact constitute 
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 
30 (now Article 28). Thus, the Pretore ordered the Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato 
(State Finance Administration) to repay the charges that had been illegally collected.56 
However, Italian State Finance Administration claimed that the Pretore could not reject to 
apply national law which is in conflict with EC Law and to declare such a law 
unconstitutional, the national court should bring the case before Italian Constitutional Court. 
 
The ECJ started its ruling by reaffirming the full and uniform application of EC Law in all 
Member States through its direct applicability in national systems.57 It continued: 
 
Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community 
Law, the relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable 
measures of the institutions on the one hand and the national law of Member 
States on the other is such that those provisions and measures not only by their 
                                                 
54 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629. 
55 Ibid., para. 5. 
56 Ibid., para. 6. 
57 Ibid., para. 14. 
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 entry in force render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of 
current national law but- in so far as they are an integral part of, and take 
precedence in, the legal order applicable in the territory of each of the Member 
States- also preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative measures to 
the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community provisions.58
 
In Simmenthal, the ECJ again stresses the effet utile principle59 and stated that accepting that a 
conflicting national law had any legal effect in the fields that the Community has competence 
would lead to “denial of the effectiveness of obligations undertaken unconditionally and 
irrevocably by Member States pursuant to the Treaty and would thus imperil the very 
foundations of the Community”60
 
It means that every national court must “apply Community law in its entirety” and “set aside 
any provision of national law which conflicts with Community law” regardless of the priority 
of their adoption.61 This is applicable to any legislative, administrative or judicial practice 
which may harm effectiveness of Community law. It does not matter that the solution of the 
conflict assigned to “an authority having its own discretion, other than the court called upon 
to apply Community law those requirements, even if such an impediment to the full 
effectiveness of Community law were only temporary.”62
 
The Simmenthal case clearly spelled out the practical implications of the principle of 
supremacy as well as of direct effect for the Community legal order which dictates immediate 
                                                 
58 Ibid., para. 17. 
59 Effet utile is a principle is one of the central principles of EC Law and denotes to principle of effectiveness of 
Community Law. This is one of the principles underlying the purposive approach of the ECJ. 
60 Ibid., para. 18. 
61 Ibid., para. 21. 
62 Ibid., para. 23. 
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 enforcement of clear and unconditional Community measure instead of any type of 
conflicting national law even provisions having constitutional character.  
 
The ECJ ruled that even if the Constitutional Court is the only authority that can rule on the 
constitutionality of a national provision (in Italian system it is the Constitutional Court that 
can order the repayment of the fees collected not the Pretore, therefore, the conflict emerged), 
any other national court faced with the problem of conflict between national law and the 
European law must apply European law immediately. The Simmenthal is one of the first cases 
where the Community law requires in certain cases national courts to exercise powers beyond 
the limits that are described under national legal systems. This indirectly leads to a change in 
the jurisdiction of the national courts. 63 In the Factortame case, the ECJ further contemplated 
on this effect of Community law on the jurisdiction of national courts by ruling that the 
national rules (the UK Law) which prohibit national courts to give certain national remedies 
(in this case it was an interim relief for Spanish ship-owners) should be set aside. In many 
cases, the ECJ avoids direct confrontation and the principle of supremacy does not dictate 
national courts to rule on the “validity” of a provision of national law or to “annul” conflicting 
national provisions, instead, it requires not to apply that provision in case of the conflict with 
Community law.64
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
After briefly introducing the fundamental concepts of the EC and the perspective of 
international law, this chapter concentrated on the perspective of the ECJ on the issue of 
supremacy of the Community law and the evolution of its case law since 1960s. From the 
                                                 
63 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 281-282. 
64 Ibid., pp. 282. 
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 entry into force of the Treaty of Rome in 1952 until today, many Treaty amendments have 
been realized. Member States had several chances to revoke Costa v. ENEL by revising the 
treaties. As they had never done so, it follows that the principle of supremacy as contemplated 
by the ECJ has to be recognized as a part of acquis communautaire (the existing body of 
European law). Member States have to observe the reciprocity principle enshrined in the 
treaties meaning that they cannot change unilaterally the principle of supremacy.65 After all, it 
is the conscious and voluntary decision on the side of the Member States to establish the 
European Communities or accede to the Union with the full member status. This reasoning is 
unwritten in the Costa v. ENEL judgment of the ECJ meaning that if Member States had 
voluntarily ratified the European Treaties, they must abide by their obligations according to 
the rules of the public international law principle (pacta sunt servanda, once signed the 
signatories of the international treaties must observe their obligations arising from those 
agreements in good faith).66 It is not, however, possible to directly establish the concept of 
supremacy of the ECJ based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda.67 For that reason, the 
ECJ enumerated several reasons demonstrating the unique nature of EC Law and its 
difference from the public international law. The new legal order has been established by the 
Member States with the aim of establishing a common market68 and with corresponding 
limitation of sovereignty of Member States by delegating important powers to the Community 
institutions. This includes the fact that Community institutions can issue ‘directly applicable’ 
acts, namely regulations. The clashes between national and EC Law may result in different 
                                                 
65 Mayer, supra note 10, pp. 1503. 
66 Wouters, supra note 41, pp. 68-70. 
67 It is rather a way to explain the relationship between national law and Community law by national courts that 
emerged as a result of rejection of Member States the hierarchy of legal acts and according to dualist system as 
will be explained in the next chapter binding force of Community law derives from the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. See also Kwiecień, supra note 27, pp. 1488. 
68 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, supra note 2, para. 23. 
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 application of law in different parts of the Union thereby endangering the uniform application 
of EC Law and effective functioning of the Union.69  
 
In practice, the possibilities for the Member States to get away from their obligations of the 
supremacy of EC Law are quite limited. Although there are areas under EC Law where the 
national courts are not under the obligation to assure the supremacy of EC Law, these are 
really restricted in scope. Article 307 (ex. Article 234), for instance, provides a derogation for 
the application of the principle of supremacy where the conflicting national provisions are 
result of obligations of State from the agreements with non Member States that dated back to 
the conclusion of the EC Treaty.70 Thus, the principle of supremacy is applicable most of the 
time when the clash occurs. 
 
After giving this brief evolution of the principle of supremacy under the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ, the next chapter will concentrate on the reception of the principle of the supremacy by 
Member States depending on different ways of transposition of provisions of EC Law mainly 
the monist and dualist systems. 
                                                 
69 Wouters, supra note 41, pp. 70. 
70 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 283. 
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 CHAPTE R I I  
THE NATIONAL LEGAL  SYSTEMS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
With its purposive interpretation in order to give effectiveness to EC Law, the ECJ has 
established the supremacy of EC law over national law. Practically, this means that if national 
courts follow the doctrine of supremacy as it was established by the ECJ, they have to accord 
precedence to EC law in their own application of law. According to this, national agencies are 
prohibited to challenge the validity of EC Law; there is a requirement to set aside national 
provisions that are contrary to Community provisions; the national legislatures are prohibited 
to enact provisions that are contrary to Community provisions; it is also required to abrogate 
national legislation that is contrary to Community law.71
  
This has marked one of the revolutions in the jurisprudence of the ECJ as well as in terms of 
international law since this challenged the traditional narrow interpretation of international 
treaties. Instead, the ECJ claimed to be in charge of filling the legal lacuna by creating 
individual rights based on the EC Treaty. Against the claims of Member States that it is not 
indicated in the Treaty that EC law has supremacy over the national law, the ECJ boldly 
asserted that the EC Treaty also does not say otherwise. This approach of the Court has 
created never-ending debates between the ECJ and the national courts. 
 
                                                 
71 Kwiecień, supra note 27, pp. 1482. See case 167/73, Commission v. France, 1974 E.C.R. 359, paras. 41-48. 
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 The first chapter attempted to describe the approach of the ECJ which is only the one side of 
the debate of supremacy.  The ECJ has made it clear that EC Law takes the precedence over 
conflicting national law. This chapter attempts to shed the light to the other side of the 
dispute: the national legal systems. Having established the development of the principle of 
supremacy based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ, this chapter will concentrate on the brief 
description of the various national legal systems and their reception of the principle of 
supremacy (i.e. the monist and the dualist systems) as it has been established by the ECJ. A 
particular emphasis will be given on the unsolved debate between the ECJ and the BVerfG. 
 
2. THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF TRANSPOSITION: THE CASE STUDIES 
 
It is crucial to understand the different national systems and the ways of reception of these 
international rules. In the national systems, there are different methods of incorporation of the 
EC Treaty by the Member States into their municipal law. Some countries follow the monist 
doctrine and some others follow dualist doctrine. In monist systems both EC Law and national 
law is part of same legal order and in case of conflict EC Law takes the precedence whereas 
in dualist systems EC Law and national law are two separate legal bodies and EC Law can 
only become part of national law through domestic legislation where revocation or 
amendment of original law is possible. Therefore in monist systems, each system has supreme 
in its own sphere. The following chapter considers some case studies concerning the dualist 
and monist legal systems. 
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 2.1 France 
According to the provision of Article 26, Treaties duly ratified by the Head of State and 
published have the force of law even if they may be in conflict with French law ‘without there 
being any need of resorting to any legislative measures other than those necessary to secure 
ratification. The 1958 Constitution which is in force today adopted this position and included 
Article 55 which further confirms the supremacy of Community law by stating that Treaties 
and Agreements’ ratified and approved ‘have an authority superior to that of laws’. Thus there 
is no need for further transposition of the international treaties into French national law as 
they are in force by the virtue of this Article of the Constitution in the internal legal order.72 
This is subject to reciprocity and the sovereign will of the French people and the EC Treaty 
Article 227 (ex Article 170)73 which includes Community remedies to enforce the EC Treaty 
in case of a Member State failing to fulfil its obligations satisfies the reciprocity criteria.  
 
2.2 Italy 
Concerning the incorporation of treaties, the 1948 Italian Constitution remains silent. Article 
11 of the Italian Constitution stipulates a delegation of national sovereignty to international 
organizations. It left open the issue of incorporation of international treaties. Thus, the 
hierarchy of legal rules is taken into account and if a treaty has an impact on a law, the treaty 
is executed in the form of a law; if it affects only administrative rules, a decree of the 
Executive deal with the issue. When it comes to the law of the ratification of the Treaties of 
Rome in 1957, Article 2 stated that ‘the agreements specified in Article 1 will receive full and 
complete execution’. Therefore, the act of ratification turned into the act of incorporation of 
                                                 
72 K P E Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union, Seventh Edition, Edinburgh: Butterworths, 2001 
pp. 338. 
73 Article 227 EC sipulates that a Member State may bring a case before the ECJ against another Member State 
which fails to fulfil its obligations arising from the EC Treaty where a similar enforcement procedure is stated 
for the Commission in Article 226 EC. 
 40
 the Treaties of Rome into Italian law. The principle of lex posterior derogat priori is deployed 
in case of conflict with national law.74
 
2.3 Germany 
According to the German system the act of ratification contains the approval of treaty and its 
incorporation. Article 24 of the Federal Constitution arranges the transfer of sovereign powers 
to inter-governmental institutions. Article 25, on the other hand, states that ‘the general rules 
of international law shall form part of federal law; they shall take precedence over the laws 
and create rights and duties directly applicable to the inhabitants of the territory of the 
federation’. It means that international treaties have the force of federal law. Federal law is 
equivalent only to ordinary law and not German constitutional law therefore international 
treaties can take precedence over only the federal law (or the law of the Länder) but cannot 
take precedence over a constitutional rule.75
 
In this dissertation, the interaction between the ECJ and the BVerfG was taken as the prime 
example for analysis because the BVerfG developed an elaborate and rich case-law over years 
which can also shed some light to our understanding towards the interaction of other national 
supreme courts with the ECJ especially the ones from the CEECs where in most of the time 
the BVerfG was taken as a model in establishing their constitutional courts.76
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 K P E Lasok, supra note 72, pp. 338. 
75 K P E Lasok, supra note 72, pp. 339. 
76 Sajó, supra note 5, pp. 366. 
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 Solange I 
The case concerns a conflict between the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and Community 
Regulations establishing the system of export/import deposits in the Internationale 
Handelsgesselshaft case.  
 
Article 24 of the German Constitution allows for the transfer of legislative power to the 
international organizations. The very first question arose with Internationale 
Handelsgesselshaft77 regarding whether Article 24 allowed the transfer a power to an 
international organization, namely the European Community, outside the German 
constitutional system that is contrary to the system that the Constitution established for the 
protection of its basic principles.78 The facts of the case as well as the judgement of the ECJ 
have been explained above in the first chapter.79 At the national level, upon receiving the 
ECJ’s ruling in that case, the German Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) ruled that: 
 
This Chamber agrees with those who wish to test Community law against the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution, since a critical appraisal of the 
views set out above shows that the view that Community law takes precedence 
cannot be based on any legal foundation. The integration powers contained in 
Article 24 enable the Federal legislature to alienate its legislative monopoly in 
certain spheres in favour of international institutions. The Community organs 
have thereby obtained the power to enact law directly effective within the 
territorial scope of the Constitution without a separate writ of enforcement. 
However, since the effect of Article 24 cannot be equated with an amendment 
of the Constitution the Federal legislature could not, when ratifying the EEC 
                                                 
77 Solange I, supra note 3. 
78 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp.289. 
79 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 49, para. 1-2. 
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 Treaty, disclaim the observance of elementary basic rights in the Constitution, 
within the scope of Article 24. 
... 
[I]f Community law... is given precedence over any divergent constitutional 
provisions, and this European legal system is exempt from the obligations 
contained in Articles 19(2) and 79(3) of the Constitution, it would lead to a 
constitutional and legal vacuum. For constitutional law would be eliminated as 
the highest national check on a European legislation …without the institution 
of equivalent legal safeguards. The democratic constitutional state guaranteed 
by the Constitution will itself only be able with difficulty to remain faithful to 
its basic decisions in constitutional law if as a result of particular advancing 
integration processes crucial spheres are withdrawn from its jurisdiction and, 
with constant decline in the standing of the national legislature, placed under a 
supranational ‘purely executive regime’ which does not have to observe the 
fundamental principles laid down in Articles 19(2) and 79(3) of the 
Constitution in its measures. 
 
According to this judgment, the German Administrative Court spelled out many concerns. If 
the principle of supremacy was accepted as the ECJ construed it would amount to a transfer of 
power to the Community more extensive than it was originally stipulated under the system 
existing at that day where there were no corresponding obligations on the part of the 
Community as under domestic legal system. Importantly, the Administrative Court pointed 
out the danger that with the integration process more and more fields come under the 
Community competence where the institutions are not bound to protect fundamental freedoms 
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 as guaranteed by the German Constitution.80 It is possible to expand this argument for 
example for the second and third pillar issues. 
 
According to the ruling of the German Administrative Court, the deposit system infringed the 
basic principles of German constitutional law and the case was brought before the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the BVerfG. BVerfG gave its Solange I decision in 1974.81
 
The part of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights is an inalienable 
essential feature of the valid Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and one which forms part of the constitutional structure of the Constitution. 
Article 24 of the Constitution does not without reservation allow it to be 
subjected to qualifications. In this, the present state of integration of the 
Community is of crucial importance. The Community still lacks a 
democratically legitimated Parliament directly elected by general suffrage 
which possesses legislative powers and to which the Community organs 
empowered to legislate are fully responsible on a political level. It still lacks in 
particular a codified catalogue of fundamental rights, the substance of which is 
reliably and unambiguously fixed for the future in the same way as the 
substance of the Constitution.... 
 
Provisionally, therefore, in the hypothetical case of a conflict between 
Community law and... the guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitution 
                                                 
80 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 290. 
81 Case Solange I, 37 BVerfGE 271, supra note 3. 
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 prevails as long as the competent organs of the Community have not removed 
the conflict of norms in accordance with the Treaty mechanism.82
 
This decision of the supreme German Court posed a danger towards the relationship between 
the national legal systems and the Community legal system. In this case, the BVerfG faced the 
problem of whether it is competent to review a secondary law of the EC due to its influence 
on the fundamental rights as protected by the German Constitution. On the part of the 
BVerfG, the main concern is not only jurisdictional problem. It is the absence of a charter for 
fundamental rights and a developed case-law of the ECJ for the protection of fundamental 
rights under the Treaty of Rome in 1950s and 1960s. The assessment of the principle of 
supremacy by the BVerfG shows that the inalienable feature of the Constitution is to protect 
fundamental rights. Although federal legislature permits transfer of powers to legislate to the 
EC, due to this concern of protection of fundamental rights the transfer of legislative powers 
under Article 24 is not definite.  
 
The BVerfG concluded that the transfer of powers is restricted to the extent that it may not 
entail a change in the basic structure of the German Basic law. As a result, in case of conflict 
the protection of fundamental rights in the German Basic Law would prevail over the 
Community Law meaning that the BVerfG has jurisdiction over EC secondary legislation to 
the extent that it can declare regulations inapplicable if they breach fundamental rights as 
protected by the German Basic Law. This means that BVerfG did not accept the supremacy of 
EC law over German Constitution; instead it established supremacy of the German 
constitution over secondary EC law in case of infringement of fundamental rights.83 The 
BVerfG is not the only Constitutional Court in Europe raising these concerns about adequate 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 291. 
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 protection of fundamental rights within the national systems. For instance, in Frontini the 
inapplicability of an EC Regulation was asserted by the plaintiff before the Italian 
Constitutional Court and the Court ruled that it will continue to review the exercise of power 
of Community institutions so as to ensure that there would not be any infringement of 
fundamental rights or the basic principles of Italian Constitutional Order.84
 
Solange II 
In 1986 Solange II case concerned a similar situation as in the Solange I case. A German 
trading company importing tinned mushrooms from third countries into Germany. According 
to the EC regulation, any importer of such products had to acquire an import license. This 
import license can be denied if the EC mushroom market required to be stabilized. The 
plaintiff company applied for the license but it was refused. Plaintiff claimed that the EC 
regulation infringes his rights to occupational and personal freedom according to Articles 
12(1) and 2(1) of the German Basic law. ECJ ruled on the validity of the system. BVerfG 
ruled on its Solange II judgment partly qualifying and partly overruling its Solange I.  
 
In view of these developments, it must be held that, so long as the European 
Communities, and in particular the case law of the European court, generally 
ensure an effective protection of fundamental rights as against the sovereign 
powers of the Communities which is to be regarded as substantially similar to 
the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the 
Constitution, and in so far as they generally safeguard the essential content of 
fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its 
jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation 
                                                 
84 Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze [1974] 2 CMLR 372. 
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 cited as the legal basis for any acts of German courts or authorities within the 
sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, and it will no 
longer review such legislation by the standard of the fundamental rights 
contained in the Constitution. 
 
This case is referred to Solange as it introduced ‘so long as’ rule. Once again it stated that the 
Community and the BVerfG follow different views on the supremacy of EC law85. Article 
23(1) of the German Basic Law gives supremacy to EC law in conjunction with each specific 
German act which empowers the EC to legislate in that field86. In its view, it is not possible to 
derive supremacy from EC law itself. Article 23(1) stipulates that the structure of German 
Basic Law cannot be altered including the catalogue of fundamental rights87. This is the part 
qualifying the similar concerns of BVerfG as in Solange I case. Solange II differs from the 
Solange I case in that in the Solange II the BVerfG stated for the first time that the level of 
protection under EC law and German Basic Law is similar after having taken into account the 
developments in EC Law since 1974 including the development of case law of the ECJ on the 
protection of fundamental rights88, democratic improvement in Community institutions and 
the fact that all Member States had acceded to the European Convention of Human Rights.89
 
Maastricht 
The Maastricht decision of the BVerfG90 in 1993 constitutes yet another reminder to the ECJ 
and Community institutions that the recognition of the principle of supremacy by the BVerfG 
                                                 
85 Case Solange II, 73 BVerfGE 339, supra note 4. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 In the subsequent judgments, the ECJ ruled that it had accepted that fundamental rights form an integral part of 
the general principles of EC law inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and the 
ECHR. This issue will be dealt in the fifth chapter in detail. Solange II, supra note 4, at p. 378. 
89 Case Solange II, 73 BVerfGE 339, supra note 4. 
90 Case Maastricht, 89 BVerfGE 155, [1994] 1 CMLR 57 - Manfred Brunner et al v. The European Union 
Treaty. 
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 depends on the abovementioned conditions. In this case, it was the constitutionality of 
Germany’s ratification of the Treaty of the European Union that was challenged.91 Legislative 
part of the ratification the Treaty on European Union were completed however before the 
formal instrument of ratification was signed by the Federal President; the plaintiffs brought 
the matter before the BVerfG and claimed that the act of approval breaches their fundamental 
rights as protected under German Basic Law. The main concern of the plaintiffs was that 
although the protection of fundamental rights under EC Law is insufficient, with the Treaty 
this area of law will be transferred to the EC and German court would lose their jurisdiction in 
that area. 
 
The BVerfG affirmed its Solange II judgment stating that the ECJ provides similar guarantees 
for the protection of fundamental rights as against the infringements on the side of the 
Community92. It was reaffirmed that BVerfG is competent to guarantee general standard of 
the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis acts of the European institutions whereas the 
ECJ does so for the specific cases93. This was called as the ‘cooperation’ relation between the 
ECJ and BVerfG94. BVerfG is there to review whether Community acts do not infringe upon 
the structure established by the German Basic Law and to make sure that the Community does 
not exceed the competences that were assigned under German approval act95.  
 
As a result of the Maastricht judgment of the BVerfG made clear that it accepted the 
supremacy of EC law conditionally. The BVerfG asserted that it will continue to ensure that 
the Community does not go beyond powers that are attributed to its competence expressly by 
the Treaty. In other words, although the BVerfG accepted that EC law takes precedence over 
                                                 
91 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 292-293. 
92 Maastricht judgement, supra note 90. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 İbid. 
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 national law for the matters fall under the Community competence it will review the actions 
of European institutions including the ECJ to ensure that they act within the limits of their 
competences. This is the ultra vires control96 or emergency competence of the BVerfG over 
the actions of Community institutions. These actions may be any decision at EU level or 
action exceeding the transfer of sovereignty agreed under Act of Accession.97 As a result, 
with this decision ultra vires acts of the Community may be challenged before the BVerfG.98
 
The main reasoning of the Maastricht judgement of the BVerfG is the belief that people of 
Europe must shape the European integration process. However, from the institutional point of 
view, other than the European Parliament which has limited powers compared to other 
Community institutions there is no equivalent representation of the people at European level 
which is equivalent to their representation at national level through national parliaments.  
 
Bananas 
Another challenge from the BVerfG to the supremacy doctrine of the ECJ concerned an EC 
regulation on the Common Market Organization (hereinafter: CMO) for bananas. The ECJ 
rejected an action brought by Germany in order to annul Council Regulation 404/9399 which 
set up a CMO for banana market.100 Under this Regulation, a preferential treatment through 
quotas was given to the ACP (African-Caribbean-Pacific) countries101 whereas the Central 
American producers with whom Germany had traditional trade relations were given lower 
quotas. As in the case of supplies exceeding the quota, the importers had to pay custom duties. 
                                                 
96 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 294. 
97 Alter, supra note 9, pp. 106. 
98 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler, The European Court and National Courts – 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998, pp. 81. 
99 Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organization of the market in 
bananas OJ  L 047 , 25/02/1993 P. 0001 - 0011
100 Bananas case, BVerfGE 102, 147 (2000) (hereinafter: Banana decision). 
101 This preference is given due to the colonial relations of certain Member States with those countries. Lomè 
Conventions provide the framework for such treatment. 
 49
 German importers claimed that this Regulation establishing preferential quota system for ACP 
countries and resultant increased custom duties for third countries in excess of quota breaches 
their fundamental rights of occupational and property freedom as established by the German 
Basic law. The ECJ rejected this claim that the Regulation infringes upon non-discrimination, 
proportionality and fundamental freedoms and that it breached the relevant provisions of 
GATT, which is an international agreement, signed by Germany creating obligations dating 
back to EC Treaty under Article 307 (ex. Article 234) of the EC Treaty and therefore takes 
precedence over EC Law.  
 
The case mainly concerned the question whether the application of Article 17-19 and Article 
21(2) of Regulation 404/93 and application of Regulation 478/95102 in Germany were 
compatible with Articles 23(1), 14(1), 12(1) and 3(1) of German Basic Law. After a series of 
cases under lower national courts, the issue was brought before the BVerfG. BVerfG declared 
the action inadmissible103. The BVerfG particularly held that constitutional review of the 
rules that are part of secondary EC law are only possible if the same level of unconditional 
protection of fundamental rights cannot be guaranteed by the ECJ.104
 
The Bananas decision signals a more conciliatory approach of the BVerfG towards the 
European integration process.105 By this decision, Solange II and Maastricht judgments were 
reaffirmed and the conditions under which the BVerfG will review Community acts were 
further substantiated.  First, the BVerfG restated that it will not review such acts as long as the 
ECJ have guarantees for effective protection of fundamental rights similar to the standards of 
                                                 
102 Commission Regulation (EC) No 478/95 of 1 March 1995 on additional rules for the application of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 as regards the tariff quota arrangements for imports of bananas into the 
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103 Bananas decision, supra note 100. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Yiannos S. Tolias, “Has the Problem Concerning the Delimitation of the Community’s Competence been 
Resolved since the Maastricht Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht?” EBLR 13 (2002), 267 pp. 276. 
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 German Basic Law. It is not required that the EC has the same standard as the German 
system. Second, a criterion was introduced in order to declare Community acts admissible 
before the BVerfG. According to this, the plaintiff must demonstrate the general level of 
protection of fundamental rights in EC is declined from the standard established in Solange II 
in 1986106. As a result more stringent conditions are enumerated for the review of Community 
acts before the BVerfG compared to Solange II and Maastricht.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
As of today, the BVerfG has never exercised its jurisdiction for review under emergency 
competence. Thus, practically, it is difficult to conclude that there is a major clash between 
the jurisdictions of the ECJ and BVerfG. It is highly improbable that there will be a decrease 
in the level of protection by EC law. With the Bananas case, it was revealed that BVerfG will 
apply very stringent conditions for the admissibility of the cases for review. However, 
theoretically, the ECJ and the BVerfG have divergent views on the supremacy of EC law. The 
future case law will show whether the BVerfG will ever need to deploy its emergency 
competence that will escalate the tension between two jurisdictions once again. The first 
signals of further debate will be described in the next chapter. 
                                                 
106 Bananas, supra note 100, pp. 164. 
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 CHAPTER I I I  
THE IMPACT O F ENLARGEMENT ON THE APP LICATI O N OF EC 
LAW 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated, as an example, the gradual ease of the tension between 
the ECJ and the BVerfG that resulted in a change of the attitude of the BVerfG in the 
protection of fundamental rights. According to the current state of affairs, the BVerfG agreed 
the supremacy of Community over the national law if a certain level of protection equivalent 
to that of Germany for the fundamental rights is ensured by EC Law. The jurisdiction of the 
BVerfG has been strictly defined under the Bananas judgment. However, this should not be 
seen as a retreat on the side of German Federal Constitutional court. This chapter, in the end, 
will turn to the German case again to prove that there is still potential for clash between two 
legal systems even in a Member State that can be regarded to have some learning experience 
as a result of series of important cases. 
 
Before doing that, another potential source of similar clash will be explained as the primary 
theme of this chapter: the enlargement of the EU included the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (hereinafter: CEEC). The recent enlargement poses similar tensions as new 
Member States have acceded to the EU together with their negative experience of 
authoritarian regimes. Since May 1, 2004, EC Law has been binding in the ten new Member 
States. These countries had to adopt the acquis communautaire (the existing body of 
European law) before the accession and thereby recognizing that EC Law not only is binding 
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 but also takes precedence over their national laws. As it is indicated in the first chapter, 
supremacy of EC law is an indispensable element in the functioning of Community legal 
order and the relation between the ECJ and national court is one of cooperation rather than a 
hierarchy. Following the German example, sometimes citing the decisions of BVerfG in the 
national judgments, by restating the ECJ of its competences, the newly established 
Constitutional Courts of the new Member States proclaimed that they are the ultimate 
guardians of national sovereignty and the Constitution.107
 
In this chapter two new Member States, namely Hungary and Poland will be scrutinized. The 
main reason for this selection is that they are representative of two differing approaches to the 
principle of supremacy. In Polish case, the accession debates ended up with recognition of a 
European clause whereas in Hungary the legislature sidestepped the overt expressions for the 
supremacy of EC Law. However, as the following cases in this part will demonstrate, the 
result did not change: the Constitutional Courts of both countries questioned the supremacy of 
EC law and clashes occurred with the ECJ rulings. 
 
Having established the approach of the BVerfG in the previous chapter, it may be helpful to 
give some account to the national systems in the CEECs. Afterwards, the recent cases before 
the Hungarian and Polish Constitutional Courts will be analyzed in detail. This chapter will 
conclude that the potential for clash still exist due to the dynamics of the recent enlargement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Hungarian Constitutional Court in Europe Agreement Judgment pp. 37 see Janos Volkai, “The Application of 
the Europe Agreement and European Law in Hungary: The Jugdment Of An Activist Constitutional Court On 
Activist Notions,” Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 8/99, Harvard Law School (2000). 
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2. NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS IN CEECs and THE IMPACT OF 
ENLARGEMENT 
 
Before the accession, in the 1990s, the fundamental reform in the legal systems of the CEECs 
was to eliminate old-fashioned aspects of communist legal systems which were designed quite 
differently from Continental legal systems (especially in the areas of criminal and civil law). 
New laws started to be passed. With the view of eventual accession, CEECs were required to 
make their laws consistent with the acquis communautaire (the existing body of European 
law).108 This has created a potential for turbulence in the national legal systems of CEECs 
with the influx of new legal concepts and values. Therefore, Europeanization has brought yet 
another challenge that resulted in the mixture of elements of old and new legal systems. 
 
In Hungary, in the last years of communist rule when there was no Constitution in the country 
a “Constitutional Council” was established for the place of Constitutional Courts under 
democratic regimes. Later, the Constitutional Court was set up in 1990. From then on, the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court has become one of the very strong state organs with its wide 
competences: to supervise the constitutionality of legal regulations passed by the Parliament, 
national government and local administrations; to monitor of acts enacted by the Parliament 
that are not signed by the President of the Republic; to interpret the Constitution109 and decide 
whether the legislature followed its duties. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the 
Constitutional Court is in a sense the most powerful state organ in the Republic of Hungary. 
Although it cannot make law, it can prevent unconstitutional acts by abrogating them. From 
                                                 
108 Zdeněk Khün, “The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) Prediction,” 
German Law Journal Vol 06 No.03, pp. 564. 
109 See Hungarian Constitution [online]; available from 
http://wiretap.area.com/Gopher/Gov/World/hungary.con; Internet: accessed on 28.05.2006. 
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 1990 to 1995, many important legal regulations were supervised by the Court and it had 
played a prominent role in shaping new Hungarian democracy.110 In analyzing the following 
national cases, it is necessary to bear in mind this central position of the Hungarian Court. 
 
The Polish Constitutional Court has competences similar to the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court yet it is not that powerful. It was established as a concession to the strong opposition 
after the imposition of Marshall Law in the 1980s.111 As the case was with the other CEECs, 
the transposition of European law into national law posed a challenge in Poland before the 
accession. However, the Polish judiciary had been staffed by renowned Polish lawyers and 
academics that were willing to achieve the expectations of further Europeanization. Even 
before the accession meaning that even before EC law officially acquires its binding force in 
Polish territory, the Polish Constitutional Court stated that Poland is obliged to ensure that 
future national legislation to be compatible with EC law to the greatest degree possible. 
According to the Polish Constitutional Court the legal basis of this statement is the Polish 
Association Agreement.112
 
Therefore, before the accession, setting up of these constitutional courts marked as an 
important cornerstone in the reform of legal systems of CEECs. After the accession, some of 
the CEECs faced a more tangible legal and constitutional challenge in bringing their national 
legal systems in harmony with the EU law. This is, after all, not an easy task to accomplish 
due to experiences of previous authoritarian regimes where certain safeguards have been 
included in the Constitutions. During the accession debates, those concerns regarding 
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 independence and sovereignty were discussed in the parliaments of post-communist countries. 
Therefore, in those countries there is a strong protection of fundamental rights in their 
Constitutions. The reason is that those countries have communist heritage that led to a long-
standing deprivation of independence. These political sensitivities reflected in the debates on 
the supremacy of EC Law and sometimes shaped the arguments that were line with 
Solange113 ruling of the BVerfG, and nevertheless resulted in adoption of favourable clauses 
as in the example of Poland.114
 
The same political sensitivities have resulted in different outcomes in some other new 
Member States such as Hungary. The debate on supremacy of EC law posed a similar type of 
tension as between the ECJ and BVerfG. In Poland, too, despite the favourable stand of the 
Constitutional Court before the Accession as well as adoption of the Europe Clause, the latter 
judgments of the Polish Constitutional Court gave contradictory results. Similar to the gradual 
change in standpoint of BVerfG, the same learning effect in these Constitutional Courts might 
be possible. Yet, latest case-law revealed that compromise has not been reached even in the 
German case. In this chapter, Poland and Hungary are chosen as case studies due the similar 
problems that they faced as well as their divergent stand concerning the adoption of European 
clauses where Poland has more benign approach. Now there is also another aspect in the 
debate on supremacy of EC law. It is the question of applicability of the principle of 
supremacy not only to EC Law under the first pillar but also to EU Law such as third pillar 
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 issues. In this connection, the European Arrest Warrant115 will be discussed with two 
important cases from Poland and Germany. 
 
2.1 Case Study: Hungary 
This part of the dissertation discusses the major developments in Hungary which is one of the 
new Member States having intrinsic features that paved the way for a new debate on 
supremacy on EC law. Hungary has a particular institutional design permitting fierce 
protection of national constitutionalism concepts. As indicated above, the Hungarian 
Constitutional court is quite powerful and allows for easy access. Furthermore, Hungary has a 
dualist system used in transposition of international treaties which often led the proclamation 
of the Court to hold the ultimate arbiter position in the national legal system.116
 
In the Hungarian accession debates the issue of supremacy of EC law was avoided and the 
supremacy clause was not inserted intentionally, although an official explanation was given as 
to the acceptance the monist approach of the ECJ.117 The standpoint of the political 
opposition was that a European supremacy clause would undermine the Hungarian 
constitution. Due to qualified majority rule of two-thirds of national parliament, the 
opposition was able to block the adoption of the Europe clause. Article 2 (A) stipulates that in 
order to accede to the EU Hungary might exercise certain constitutional competences to 
implement obligations under the EC Treaty in conjunction with other Member States, and 
these constitutional competences might be exercised directly by the institutions of the EU. 
The term ‘transfer’ of rights was avoided on purpose, thereby giving the government a kind of 
                                                 
115 2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States - Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of 
the Framework Decision OJ L 190, 18/07/2002 P. 0001 – 0020. 
116 Hungarian Constitutional Court in Europe Agreement Judgment pp. 37 see Volkai, supra note 107, pp. 5. 
117 Sajó, supra note 5, pp. 353. 
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 reservation that the Constitutional Court will have competence to review the secondary 
legislation of the EU. The situation is that under the Hungarian Constitution and the 
Constitutional Court Act of 1989 which has given the Constitutional Court extensive review 
competences, it is possible to review the Accession Treaty as well. Since the Hungarian 
government could not satisfy the majority criteria in the parliament to enact the European 
clause and prevent the Constitutional court using its review powers of Community law, the 
uncertainty remains. The case118 below concerns the tension between the ECJ and the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court under this situation of uncertainty. 
 
As to the background of the issue, in April 2004 (one month before the accession treaty 
entered into force) the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law on agricultural surplus stocks 
(hereinafter, the Surplus Act). This is the law that is implementing the Commission 
Regulation No 1972/2003 119 and another Commission Regulation No. 60/2004 120 setting up 
transitional measures in the sugar sector. The regulation in question aimed at eliminating the 
effect of speculative movements creating agricultural surplus and it proposed a system to 
calculate this surplus. The European legislature wanted the new Member States to device a 
system to identify those that are responsible for speculative movements. The President of 
Hungary instead of promulgating the law submitted the issue to the Constitutional Court for a 
“review of unconstitutionality”. While the Constitutional Court was pursuing a preliminary 
review, on the 1st of May 2004 Hungary became a Member State of the EU. On 25th of May 
                                                 
118 This decision is not available in English as of May 2006 so I quoted from the Article of András Sajó, supra 
note 5. 
119Commission Regulation (EC) No 1972/2003 of 10 November 2003 on transitional measures to be adopted in 
respect of trade in agricultural products on account of the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia OJ L 293, 11/11/2003 P. 0003 – 0006. 
120 Commission Regulation (EC) No 60/2004 of 14 January 2004 laying down transitional measures in the sugar 
sector by reason of the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia OJ L 009 , 15/01/2004 P. 0008 – 0012. 
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 2004 the Constitutional Court found the Act unconstitutional. Due to that reason the Surplus 
Act was not promulgated.  
 
The problem arises from the interpretation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court of the 
Surplus Act as retroactive and not giving fair lead time. Thus the act was considered as 
infringing upon a fundamental right namely the legal certainty. Even if the President had 
signed the Surplus Act without submitting it to the constitutional review, the act would have 
entered into force on 25th of May 2004. However, the European legislature defined the 
obligations under the Surplus Act starting much more before by 1st of May 2004. The 
contentious point is that Member States have to develop and implement measures to be 
applicable as of 1st of May in order to meet their obligations. As the according to Hungarian 
Constitution the Surplus Act can only enter into force by 25th of May, making the 
promulgation of the law retroactive and thus unconstitutional. This is going to be explained 
below. 
 
The long period for entry into force of the Act was related to the amendments made during the 
legislative process of the Act. The competent authorities of the Community informed the 
accession state delegations concerning the need to create stock inventories for increased 
number of different products (from eight to more than fifty products) compared to inventory 
in the 1995 accession process. Despite the complaints of accession states concerning this 
change, the regulations were enacted. Based on those complaints they were amended in a 
short period of time. The Sugar Regulation was forwarded to the Parliament while there were 
still amendments for the first regulation121 (i.e. Regulation No. 1972/2003 of November 
2003). Hungarian government was planning to use an expedited parliamentary procedure and 
                                                 
121 See Regulation No. 1972/2003, supra note 120. 
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 to promulgate the Act 45 days before its entry into force and before the accession of Hungary. 
45 days were targeted as according to National Expenditure Act, the obligations of tax-payer 
cannot apply before 45 days from promulgation of a legislative act. The planned date of 
promulgation was not realized because there was no quorum in Parliament for voting. 
 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court confirmed the unconstitutionality claims of the Surplus 
Act as it infringes upon legal certainty. Under the Constitution, Hungary is the state of the 
rule of law which necessitates legal certainty comprising fair lead time and non-retroactivity. 
The principle of non-retroactivity was breached as the surplus stock was to be determined as 
the difference between inventory on 1st of May 2004 and daily average of product in 2002-
2003. Meanwhile the transactions made after 1st of January were not going to be calculated as 
the decrease in the stock. Moreover, the inventory establishing the stock by 1st of May was 
retroactive considering the earliest date for entry into force was three weeks later. There is no 
fair lead time for the affected person who was required to pay the charge was not given due 
time to know this arrangements. Also the Constitutional Court found that under the Surplus 
Act the task of definition of the entities entitled to pay the charge and the method of 
calculation was given to executive decrees which infringed the Constitution which stipulates 
that fundamental rights as well as duties are determined through Parliamentary act. 
 
From the practical side the problem was that the Hungarian Constitutional Court overruled the 
application of the Community regulations, thereby ignoring the principle of supremacy as it 
has been established by the ECJ over conflicting national rules even having the constitutional 
character.122 The Hungarian Constitutional Court in order to avoid direct confrontation on the 
issue of supremacy of EC Law sidestepped this issue. Its decision was neither related to 
                                                 
122 Simmenthal, supra note 54. 
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 validity nor interpretation of Community law. It perceived the Surplus Act different from 
original Community regulation by pointing that regulations determine the obligations of 
Member States not the obligations of their citizens. It was the Hungarian Act in question and 
the contentions provisions were not the translations of the regulations but they were shaped 
according to Hungarian legislation. Thus, when it comes to the issue of setting obligations for 
the Hungarian citizens, it is the Constitutional Court which protects fundamental rights 
through judicial review.  
 
From the perspective of EC law, according to the Article 249 of the EC Treaty a regulation 
“shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States” and there is no 
need for transposition. That means that irrespective of the Surplus Act under the national 
legislation, the regulation in question has already been a part of Hungarian law. As opposed to 
what the Hungarian Constitutional Court asserts the contentious provisions of the Act were 
identical with the Regulation. Therefore, with the practice of the ECJ it may not be considered 
as retroactive. The real issue in this case is not whether the Act in question was retroactive or 
not but the way of reception of Community law by the national legal system of Hungary. The 
Surplus Act whose content was determined by Community Regulation found by the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court as retroactive.  
 
The standpoint of the ECJ in this case was already spelled out in its Internationale 
Handelsgesellshaft judgment: 
 
“Recourse to the legal rules and concepts of national law in order to judge the 
validity of measure adopted by the institutions of the Community would have 
an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The 
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 validity of such measures can only be judged on the light of Community 
law”123
 
Instead the Hungarian Constitutional Court refuses to accept that the Surplus Act and the 
problems attached to it concerned the Community legislation, therefore EC law. This 
resembled to the conflict between the BVerfG and the ECJ in Solange and Maastricht cases. 
It is also true that the standpoint of the BVerfG has changed over time and it came to the point 
to accept that the European legal system provides equivalent protection of fundamental rights 
as the BVerfG. Will this be the case for the Hungarian Constitutional Court?124  
 
There was no direct confrontation between the two legal systems as the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court did not say it open that it has special protection of fundamental rights 
under the Constitution that is better than the EU system. Instead, the Constitutional Court 
avoided the question of supremacy of EC law. Thus it is not possible to accuse the 
Constitutional Court of its denial of reference. However, the problem is deep rooted and there 
will be times that the confrontation cannot be evaded. In that case, it is of use to look at the 
evolution of the principle of supremacy and the ease of clash between old Member States such 
as Germany. It is possible to expect a long learning process though not in the form of sudden 
revolution. Up until then the clashes can be expected. The following part will deal with 
another new Member State which already passed the European clause but still having 
problems with the concept of supremacy of EC law. 
 
                                                 
123 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 49, para. 3. 
124 Sajó, supra note 5, pp. 367. 
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 2.2 Case Study: Poland 
After the accession of Poland into the EU, the Polish Constitutional Court faced the problem 
that led to discussions about the principle of supremacy of EC law. According to Article 91(3) 
of the Polish Constitution “if an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an 
international organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and 
have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws.” 
 
This European clause in the Constitution overtly recognizes the precedence of EC law over 
any conflicting national law. However the following cases have revealed that the relation 
between the Polish Constitutional Court and the ECJ will not be as smooth as it was expected. 
 
The first case was specifically related to the third pillar, therefore, to the EU law. In that 
regard, it is crucial to mention the recent developments in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Until 
recently, the supremacy of EC law was used for the cases under the first pillar, EC law. 
However, the recent Pupino125 judgment of the ECJ revealed the Court is trying to introduce 
the same principle for the third pillar matters mainly cooperation in criminal matters as such 
matters began to come under its competence. 
 
The first case126 concerned Polish law implementing the European Arrest Warrant 
(hereinafter: EAW) of 27th of April 2005 and the issue of surrendering Polish citizens. Poland 
implemented the Framework Decision on the EAW and the procedures of surrender between 
Member States of 13th of June 2002 through an amendment of the Polish Criminal Procedure 
                                                 
125 Judgement of 16 June 2005, C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino, Press Release no 59/05, 
infra note 147. 
126 Judgement of 27th April 2005, P 1/05, for English translation [online]; available from www.trybunal.gov.pl; 
Internet: Accessed on 14.04.2006. 
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 Code of 1997. There were discussions before the adoption this Framework Decision that it 
infringes the Article 55 of the Polish Constitution. Article 55 states that: 
 
1. The extradition of a Polish citizen shall be forbidden.  
2. The extradition of a person suspected of the commission of a crime for 
political reasons but without the use of force shall be forbidden.  
3. The courts shall adjudicate on the admissibility of extradition. 
 
Despite views pointing to the necessity of amending the constitution, it was retained intact. 
Instead, the Criminal Procedure Code was changed. According to these amendments, there 
was no procedure overtly allowing the extradition of Polish citizens from Polish territory. 
However, Article 607 p of Criminal Procedure Code stipulated the reasons for refusing to 
execute an EAW and it does not state Polish citizenship among those reasons for rejection of 
executing an EAW. There are some other provisions that are bringing restrictions to extradite 
Polish citizens and persons enjoying political asylum in Poland. These situations are: first, 
issuing an EAW for executing a previously imposed custodial sentence or detention order 
(Article 607 s) and issuing an EAW for prosecuting a person for criminal offence (Article 607 
t). The latter was the issue that was brought before the Regional Court Gdańsk which referred 
the case to the Polish Constitutional Court. The Regional Court had received an application on 
issuing a surrender decision for Polish citizen Maria D. in order for the criminal proceeding 
against her to be conducted in the Netherlands. The Regional Court had to apply the Article 
607 t of the Criminal Code. However, it decided to stay the proceedings and asked for review 
of constitutionality according to Article 55 of the Polish constitution. The Constitutional 
Court ruled that Article 607 t was not in conformity with Article 55.1 of the Constitution.  
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 According to Krystyna Kowalik-Bañczyk,127 on the surface, this ruling of the Polish 
Constitutional Court can be considered as a refusal of the supremacy of the Framework 
decisions in relation to Polish Constitution. The ruling of the Constitutional Court has a 
potential to pose a similar tension as in the Hungarian case. However, the detailed ruling of 
the Constitutional Court reveals the acceptance by the Constitutional Court of the supremacy 
of ECJ law. The Polish Constitutional Court made it clear that it was the provisions of Polish 
Criminal Procedure Code that were declared unconstitutional. In fact, it recognized the 
supremacy of EC law by suggesting the amendment of the Constitution and reiterating the 
obligation to interpret domestic law in consistence with EU law. This meant that the Polish 
Constitutional Court recognized that the Polish Constitution was no longer a definite 
framework of control and as far as it contradicts EC law it needed to be amended. Indeed, the 
Polish Constitutional Court used its discretion to maintain the unconstitutional provisions of 
the Criminal Procedure for the maximum period possible (eighteen months) to give a chance 
to the Polish legislature to amend the Constitution. In practice this meant that the 
unconstitutional provisions are still applicable and the national courts have to apply them 
without asking for review of constitutionality.  
 
However, two weeks after this decision, in another judgment128, the Constitutional Court 
denied its ruling in the EAW case above. This was about three motions submitted against the 
Polish accession to the European Union set by three groups of deputies in the lower chamber 
of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) due to the conditions in the Accession Treaty. The judgment 
of the Constitutional Court as a response to these motions was highly controversial for 
                                                 
127 Krystyna Kowalik-Bañczyk, “Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of 
Supremacy of EC law” German Law Journal Vol. 6 No.10 – 1 October 2005 pp. 4. 
128 Judgment of 11th of May 2005, K 18/04, English summary is available [online]; available from 
www.trybunal.gov.pl; Internet: Accessed on 14.04.2006. 
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 following reasons. According to Article 188129 of the Polish Constitution, the Polish 
Constitutional Court has constitutional control over the conformity of ratified international 
agreements that Poland signs. The judgment of the Constitutional Court concerned various 
provisions of the Polish Constitution concerning their relation vis-à-vis the European law. The 
matter in question was the conformity of the Accession Treaty provisions with the principles 
of the sovereignty of the Polish Nation and supremacy of the Constitution over other legal 
acts existing in legal acts under the Polish legal system. The applicants asserted that under the 
Polish Constitution, the accession to international organizations is possible not the 
supranational organizations like the EU. 
 
This judgment130 of the Constitutional Court posed interesting questions regarding the review 
of competences of Community institutions (thereby risking the uniform application of the 
Community law) and retaining sovereignty concerns of the new Member States.131 In its 
judgment, for all these provisions, the Constitutional Court denied the inconformity with the 
Polish Constitution. On the surface, this might be interpreted as acceptance of the supremacy 
of EC law. However, the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in this judgment reveals the 
opposite to the extent that it overruled its judgment on EAW case by taking the Polish 
Constitution as a reference of control. The mere fact that the Constitutional Court issued this 
judgment thereby recognizing its competence to review the legality of Accession Treaty 
meant that it did not recognize the supremacy of EC law over the conflicting national law. 
                                                 
129 Article 188: The Constitutional court shall adjudicate regarding the following matters: 
1) the conformity of statutes and international agreements to Constitution 
2) the conformity of statute to ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent 
granted by statute 
3) the conformity of legal provisions issued by central State organs to the Constitution, ratified 
international agreements and statutes 
4) the conformity to the Constitution of the purposes or activities of political parties 
5) complaints concerning constitutional infringements, as specified in Article 79(1). 
130 Judgment of 11th of May 2005, K 18/04, [online]; available from English summary is available at 
www.trybunal.gov.pl; Internet: Accessed on 14.04.2006. 
131 Kowalik-Bañczyk, supra note 127, pp. 7. 
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According to the reasoning of the Polish Constitutional Court, the accession of the Republic 
of Poland had not undermined the supremacy of the Polish Constitution over the whole legal 
order of the Republic of Poland. The inconformity of the national law (provision of 
Constitution in this case) with EC law would not mean invalidity of such Constitutional 
norms. Polish integration to Europe is based on the Polish Constitution meaning that legal 
basis for integration was based on the Polish Constitution. The provision under the Polish 
Constitution made it possible for Poland to accede to the EU. Thus, any transfer of rights and 
respective competences has to respect the principles of the Constitution.  
 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the accession to the Union would not amount to loss of 
sovereignty and independence. According to the Court, Article 8 of the Polish Constitution 
stipulates that the highest source of law in Poland is the Constitution. Article 9 states the fact 
that Poland respects its obligations stemming from international agreements. This signifies 
two levels of law in the Polish legal system. However, the Constitution has supremacy over 
all other acts including international agreements that enter into force by referendum.  
 
The judgment of the Constitutional Court can be considered as a denial of its earlier judgment 
in the EAW case. The Court stated that the interpretation of national law in lines with EC law 
cannot be made if the provision in question breaches the Constitution. The Constitution set the 
minimum limit for the protection of fundamental rights within the Polish legal system.132
 
The judgment is striking because it is possible to observe the same denial patterns as in 1970s 
of supremacy of EC law and the jurisdiction of the ECJ for review: the Court ruled as far as 
                                                 
132 Ibid., pp. 7. 
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 supremacy of EC law is concerned that Member States can still review whether the 
Community institutions act within the limits of their competences in line with the 
proportionality and subsidiarity principles. This is a clear overruling of its EAW judgment 
since there is no suggestion for the amendment of the Constitution as in the EAW decision.133 
Franz C. Mayer asserted that parts of this decision of the Polish Constitutional Court seem 
even more incompatible with European law than the BVerfG’s 1974 Solange I decision.134
 
3. GERMANY: DOES THE BVerfG STRIKE BACK? – THE DARKAZANLI 
CASE 
Another interesting development in this very controversial subject of the supremacy of EC 
law is the Darkazanli judgment of the BVerfG of 18th of July 2005135. Mr. Darkazanli 
possesses German and Syrian citizenship. Under Articles 515.2 and 516.2 of the Spanish 
Criminal Code he was accused by the Spanish authorities of participation in a criminal 
organization and of participation to terrorist activities. In particular he was accused of 
providing financial support and serving as contact for the Al-Quaida network in Germany. 
The German authorities conducted investigations about him, too. However, due to insufficient 
evidence, they did not initiate criminal proceedings against him. Meanwhile in September 
2004, the Spanish District Court in Madrid issued an EAW against Mr. Darkazanli and 
requested his extradition to Spain from the German authorities. Based on that request, the 
German authorities arrested him in October 2004 and approved his extradition to Spain.136 
Mr. Darkazanli challenged this extradition before the BVerfG based on the fact that German 
                                                 
133 Ibid., pp. 8. 
134 Mayer, supra note 10, pp. 1499. 
135 Darkazanli case, supra note 8. 
136 Simone Mölders, “European Arrest Warrant Act Is Void – The Decision of the German Federal Court of 18 
July 2005” German Law Journal  Vol.7 No.1 pp. 46-47. 
 68
 European Arrest Warrant breaches some of his fundamental rights as protected by the German 
Basic Law particularly Articles 2(1), 3 (1), 16(2), 19(4) and 103(2)137: 
Article 16(2): No German may be extradited to a foreign country. A d
regulation to cover extradition to a Member State of the European Union o
international court of law may be laid down, provided that const
principles are observed.   
ifferent 
r to an 
itutional 
aw as a 
                                                
Article 103(2): An act may be punished only if it was defined by a l
criminal offence before the act was committed.  
The issue in this case was similar to the Polish case described above: whether the German 
European Arrest Warrant breaches the fundamental rights as protected by the German Basic 
Law specifically, the Article 16 (2) second sentence. Article 16 (2) allows extradition of 
Germans to the extent that the principles of constitutionality are not infringed upon meaning 
that German legislature will examine the principles of a constitutional state are ensured by the 
Member State issuing the arrest warrant asking for its execution.138 This is required in order 
to be sure that while implementing EAW framework decision, the fundamental right of 
“freedom form extradition” is not restricted in a non-proportionate way. In this case this is 
more important because the matter of the case is covered by an intergovernmental pillar. The 
underlying objective of the Article 16 (2) is to ensure that no German national would be left in 
a situation where he fears from to be extradited to another Member State whose national 
criminal law he does not know and whose democratic legislative process he did not 
participate.  
 
 
 
137 See the English translation from [online]; available from http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/info/030gg.pdf; 
Internet: Accessed on 14.04.2006. 
138 Mölders, supra note 136, pp. 48. 
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 Finally, Article 103 (2) was breached by the EAW Framework Decision. The reason is that 
Article 81 (4) of the German European Arrest Warrant Act (i.e. the German implementation 
act of EAW framework decision) stipulated that it is possible to extradite a German national 
to another Member State if the contested conduct of the German national is regarded a 
criminal offence under the law of the Member State asking the execution of extradition. That 
means that even if the alleged conduct of the German national does not amount to a criminal 
offence under German law, the German national can be extradited to another Member State if 
the alleged conduct constitutes a crime under Article 2(2) of the EU framework decision. 
These offences include murder, rape, arson or terrorism. Therefore the basic right stipulated 
under Article 103 (2) that an act may be punished if it is defined by law as a criminal offence 
before the act was committed was breached. 
 
As in the Polish case, this case cannot be merely seen as a German constitutional problem. 
Underneath there is the dispute on the principle of supremacy between the EU law and 
German Constitutional law. It is true that the German European Arrest Warrant is the act of 
implementation of the EU framework decision described above. It can be considered as part 
of national law. Yet, the BVerfG ruled in its later judgments that the Solange II criteria are 
also applicable to the national law having the aim of implementing a Directive. If the BVerfG 
begin to treat the EU Framework decisions as directives, according to the Solange II (where 
the BVerfG came to the conclusion that the level of protection of fundamental rights in the 
Community is similar to German legal system) it could not exercise its jurisdiction over 
German European Arrest Warrant in so far as it is an implementation act of the EU 
Framework Decision. In the contrary, if it decided to review the act in question, this would 
amount to a retreat from the Solange II to Solange I case law, thereby endangering the current 
status quo of relations between the ECJ and the BVerfG under Maastricht decision. 
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The BVerfG ruled that the German European Arrest Warrant was void. The argument is that 
this implementing act breaches the right to freedom from extradition as stipulated under 
Article 16(2) of the German Basic Law in a disproportionate manner. According to the 
BVerfG, the EU framework decision must be considered as being outside EC Law as it 
concerned an issue under the third pillar, therefore, outside the EC legal order. This meant that 
Member States have competence to deny the changes made under this area. Under that 
competence, German legislature was required to transpose the concerned framework decision 
in the light of the standards as it was laid down in the Constitution particularly Article 16 
(2)139. However, as the case showed, it has failed to do so140.  
 
As a result of the decision, Mr. Darkazanli was entitled to be released from prison and not to 
be extradited to Spain. Furthermore, it made it clear that unless German legislature does not 
adopt a new implementing act giving the highest possible consideration to the fundamental 
rights as laid down under German Basic Law, it is not possible to extradite a German national 
to another Member State under the European Arrest Warrant.141  
 
This case cannot be regarded as overruling of the BVerfG of Solange II and Maastricht 
judgments. The BVerfG accused the German legislature rather than the European legislature 
of acting contrary to the fundamental principles as protected under the German Basic Law. In 
other words, it was the German legislature failing to comply with the standards while 
transposing the relevant EC legislation. At the same time, however, it is difficult to see the 
mild approach of the Polish Constitutional Court in this issue. It was taken for granted by the 
BVerfG that the German Basic Law is the absolute framework for reference. Therefore it is 
                                                 
139 Ibid., para. 79. 
140 Ibid., para. 93. 
141 Ibid., para. 120. 
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 possible to conclude that this judgment of BVerfG might create another tension with the ECJ 
as the BVerfG did not take into account the recent the Pupino judgment of the ECJ. This 
judgment is particularly important as the ECJ ruled that the principle of loyal cooperation 
stipulated under Article 10 is also applicable in the area of police and judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters and not only in the field of first pillar matters142. Therefore, the Member 
States are obliged to apply the principle of supremacy also to third pillar matters. This is 
definitely not the case in the Darkazanli judgment of the BVerfG. 
 
It may be of use to differentiate between the cases discussed above. In the Hungarian case, the 
matter concerned a first pillar issue, therefore EC law is at stake whereas the first case of 
Poland and the German case are related to EAW which is considered under the third pillar, the 
EU law. In the Accession Treaty judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court, the matter 
related to whole EU Treaty. Moreover, in the Hungarian case, the EC legislation at issue was 
in the form of regulation. Thus, there is no way of the same reasoning as in the other EAW 
judgments where the legislations in question are in the form of EU framework decision. 
Therefore in the later cases, it was possible for national courts to claim that it is the national 
legislation that does not take into account the higher values enshrined in the Constitution 
while transposing the EU framework decision not EC law.  
 
That’s why in the Hungarian case and the Polish case on the Accession Treaty, it is 
straightforward to establish denial of principle of supremacy by the Constitutional Courts 
whereas in other decisions this is not that apparent. As a result it is possible to conclude that 
the tension between the Constitutional Courts and the ECJ is still in existence not only in 
CEECs which have Constitutions protective of fundamental rights and democracy but also in 
                                                 
142 Pupino, supra note 125, at para. 42. 
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 Germany whose Constitutional Court has established a co-operation relationship between the 
ECJ over the years where the supremacy of EC law though with reservation that it has 
emergency competence. This tension between the BVerfG and the ECJ arose as new areas 
come under the Community competence. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
 
It was the legacy of the communist regimes that have shaped the legal systems in many 
CEECs. In order to understand the current tensions between the Constitutional Courts of these 
countries and the ECJ, it is necessary to grasp the features of these legal systems together with 
their peculiarities. In Hungary, for instance, Constitutional Court is one of the strongest -in 
some instances, the strongest- state organs protecting the democratization process. It is not 
awkward to expect a similar tension with the ECJ as in the case of the BVerfG. After all, 
many CEECs including Hungary have imitated the BVerfG while establishing their 
Constitutional Courts.143 Indeed, one of the recent judgments of Hungarian Constitutional 
Court cited above revealed that this may be the case. Even the new Member States that had 
favourable approach to the supremacy issue have proved that they might as well experience 
the same difficulties like Hungary. Poland is one of those countries having adopted a clear 
European clause in its Constitution with its accession to the Union and repeatedly supported 
the uniform application of Community law. However, the two cases analysed above showed 
that it cannot escape from the question regarding who is going to decide about 
constitutionality of national acts adopted to transpose the EC legislation. What is more, is that 
recently, an old debate has been opened, too. With the EAW judgment, the BVerfG appeared 
                                                 
143 Sajó, supra note 5, pp. 366. 
 73
 again in the centre of the debate. The next chapter will turn to theoretical side of the debate 
with the attempt to find a viable solution to this tension. 
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 CHAPTE R IV 
THE LEGAL DEBATE an d  POSSI BLE METHODS TO OVERCOME 
THE CLASH 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter attempted to give some insight to the debate on the supremacy of EC 
law that it is still relevant in the face of developments with the accession of New Member 
States. Even in the countries where the transition was smooth, such as Poland, it is possible to 
observe the first symptoms of the same tension between the ECJ and the Constitutional Courts 
of old Member States. The question that remains would be a way to approach this problem: 
will there be any way to avoid this conflict or should we accept things as they are and try to 
prevent further tensions with methods shorter than a real solution?  
 
The objective of this chapter is to go back to the roots of the debate on supremacy of the 
EC/EU law and bring some theoretical understanding based on previous chapters. In this 
context, the monist approach of the ECJ and pluralist view of Member States with dualist 
systems, the competences of Community institutions and limits of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
 
2. THE LEGAL DEBATE REVISITED 
 
As described before, the EC Treaty does not make any explicit reference to the relationship 
between the national legal orders and the EC legal order. It is silent concerning under which 
circumstances EC law takes precedence over conflicting national legislation. The only thing 
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 that gives some hints regarding the desired functioning of the Community system can be 
found in Article 249(2) which stipulates that regulations shall be generally and directly 
applicable in the Member States. This is indeed one of the justifications for supremacy of EC 
law that the ECJ asserted in Costa v. ENEL decision.144 As the reasoning of the Constitutional 
Courts in the Member States demonstrated, this does not explicitly establish the principle of 
supremacy in the EC Treaty. Thus, the theoretical debate goes on.  
 
The main problem over the debate of principle of supremacy is the delimitation on the 
competences between the two systems and the determination concerning who is going to be 
the final arbiter deciding unconstitutionality of a piece of legislation, somewhat related to the 
EC legislation. It can be either at the stage of adopting EC legislation or at the stage of 
passing a national legislation transposing EC legislation. 
 
The constitutional clash occurs in fact due to the uncertainty regarding the limits of 
Community competence.145 When one analyses the Bananas judgment of BVerfG, it appears 
that it adopted a more conciliatory approach. On the other side, the ECJ is also more cautious 
in asserting the limits of the Community competence.146 However, the judgments of BVerfG 
in the later judgment reveal that this may not be the case. It seems that BVerfG is still 
asserting itself as the only authority, the final arbiter concerning the applicability of secondary 
Community law (such as regulations) within the national order and question their 
constitutionality. Up to now the BVerfG has not exercised its claimed jurisdiction on that 
matter since it declared that as long as the European Communities have effective protection of 
                                                 
144 Costa v. ENEL, supra note 29. 
145 Tolias, supra note 105. 
146 In the Case 376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising case) [2000]  ECR I-
1267 where the ECJ decided that part of the Directive in question prohibiting certain types of advertising and 
sponsorhip of tobacco products could have been adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC whereas some other 
aspects of the prohibition exceed the Community competence and therefore it needs to be partially annuled. See 
also Tolias, supra note 105, pp. 281. 
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 fundamental rights, the BVerfG will not exercise its jurisdiction on the applicability of 
secondary Community law. As it is not foreseen that the Community will decrease its 
standards of protection of fundamental rights, the clash on that issue may not be expected. 
Yet, the competences issue in general remains unresolved. For instance, the conflict may 
occur between two legal systems if the ECJ applies fundamental principles of Community law 
in areas - such as defence- where it does not have competence.147 As a result, the crucial 
question to be answered is the final arbiter is over the secondary EC legislation. 
 
2.1 The Monist Approach of the ECJ 
 
Concerning the review of the constitutionality of Community law148 the ECJ alone has the 
competence to review or abrogate the Community measures. Therefore, it is not possible for 
the Courts of the Member States to declare Community legislation incompatible, therefore 
unconstitutional based on their own constitutional provisions.149 This line of thinking requires 
from the national constitutional courts not to rule on the substance of the case but to declare 
their lack of jurisdiction on the case. The logic is that legality of such legislations that 
determines their application in the Member States is reviewed under EC law and the ECJ is 
the only authority to do so under European law. In this regard, a national court cannot claim 
its jurisdiction in such a case at the first place. Thus, national courts cannot claim that such as 
case as admissible before their court even though they subsequently decide to dismiss the case 
on the merits of the case (i.e. the substance of the case). That is why according to the monist 
view of the ECJ, the Polish Accession judgment is problematic.150
                                                 
147 Tolias, supra note 105, pp. 281. 
148 Mattias Kumm, “Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the 
Relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and The European Court of Justice”, Common 
Market Law Review 36: 1999. pp. 352. 
149 Kumm, supra note 148, pp. 354. 
150 See Polish Constitutional Court Accession Treaty Judgment, supra note 131. 
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This monist approach of the ECJ has also its roots and legal basis in the EC Treaty, mainly 
Article 220 EC (ex Article 164)151 and Article 230 (ex Article 173)152. According to the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, there are three main reasons for the supremacy of EC law. First, 
there is an international legal obligation that, once signed, Treaties must be observed (pacta 
sunt servanda) In the Humblet153 case this general principle of international law serves as one 
of the justifications of the ECJ for the supremacy of EC law. The second justification is one of 
the underpinnings of the European legal system: the establishment of “a new legal order of 
international law” by Treaties.154 For the autonomous nature of the Community law, the ECJ 
has not come up with theoretical explanations.155 Kumm enumerated the factors that show 
that the EC legal order indeed has autonomy, thereby, emancipating itself from the legal order 
of the Member States: 
 
(a) the ric  sphere, 
(b) that h mber States’ legal orders and, 
(d) held t  the ECJ,  
(e) enacte  decision-
making a
(f) adjudi  ,  
lence of a teleological method of legal reasoning, 
phenomenologically distinguishable from the focus on text and the 
                                                
h body of law in important areas not strictly limited to the economic
ave direct effect in Me
(c) are supreme over national statutory law,  
o a fundamental rights standard elaborated by
d, at least in part, by a legislative process involving majoritarian
nd participation of a European Parliament,  
cated within a system that prescribes compulsory judicial review and
(g) the preva
 
151 It stipulates that “The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, ..., shall ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of this Treaty the law is observed”. 
152 This article concerns the powers of the Court for the review of legality of the Community acts. 
153 Case 6/60, Humblet v. Belgian State, 1960 E.C.R. 559, 569. This case was also emphised in Wouters, supra 
note 41. 
154 Van Gend en Loos, supra note 2, pp.6. 
155 Wouters, supra note 41, pp. 66. 
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 will of the contracting parties that typically characterizes 
interpretation in international law.156
 
The last justif ctiveness of 
EC law. The hich is that 
without the e y, it is not possible to talk about the direct 
ffect of Community legislation and therefore of EC law at all.157 The ECJ has developed its 
European level. The supremacy of the 
uropean legal order is essential to ensure the major aim of the EC Treaty: The uniformity of 
ber State fails to fulfil its 
ommunity law obligations. Also national courts play important role in the enforcement of 
                                                
ication is explained in Costa v. ENEL: the uniformity and full effe
ECJ has a pragmatic goal in mind while inserting this justification w
xistence of the principle of supremac
e
reasoning of efficacy and uniform application of Community law in Simmenthal case in the 
following years. As a result of this case law, the principle of supremacy has been established 
with all its consequences in the national legal systems. 
 
Therefore, the judicial review is institutionalised at the European level and Member States 
cannot make their version of Treaty interpretations by undermining the principle of 
supremacy.158 It is the ECJ who decides the law at the 
E
the legal order. The result is that ECJ has the role of final arbiter.  
 
In this respect, it is essential to mention the duties of the Member States and their institutions 
particularly national courts under EC law. National courts are crucial as they are the organs in 
the Member States that decide on what will happen if a Mem
C
EC law within national boundaries as described in the first chapter. According to Article 10 of 
EC Treaty; 
 
 
156 Kumm, supra  note 148, pp. 356-357. 
157 Kwiecień, supra note 27, pp. 1483. 
158 Ibid., p. 1482. See also Kumm, supra  note 148,  pp. 354. 
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 Member States shall take appropriate measures, whether general or particular, 
to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting 
from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate 
the achievement of the Community’s tasks. 
 
As a consequence of the principle of supremacy under the established case-law of the ECJ, 
the na apply 
nationa flict with EC law; they cannot enact such conflicting 
ational legislation and they are under the obligation to abrogate such national legislation.159
e 
provement of coherent legal order and effective protection of fundamental rights across the 
t there is no such thing as autonomous legal order at the 
uropean level, so no precedence of EC law over national laws.162 The principle of 
                                                
 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of 
the objectives of this Treaty. 
tional courts cannot challenge the validity of Community law; they cannot 
l provisions that are in con
n
 
From the general perspective, indeed this logic is required to ensure the Rule of Law in the 
EC. The jeopardy of limiting the rule of law to the national jurisdictions can be explained 
under various headings. The clash of interests between the nation-states may limit th
im
borders160 and create uncertainty. 
 
However, the monist approach has its flaws. It is still questionable to accept the grounds 
described above except the one stemming from international law.161 The main argument 
against this line of thinking is tha
E
 
159 Kwiecień, supra note 27, pp. 1482. 
160 Kumm, supra  note 148, 358. 
5. 
161 Kwiecień, supra note 27, pp. 1483. 
162 Kumm, supra  note 148, pp. 35
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 supremacy cannot be considered in isolation without a further analysis of another concept of 
the Community law, namely the principle of conferral of competences or attribution of 
powers. It means that the upper level (the EC) has the competence and the power only if the 
lower level (the Member States) has given this competence. This logic dictates that Member 
State are still the “master of the Treaties” as they have the Kompetenz-Kompetenz (the 
competence to decide on competences over all the constituent units) where they give 
corresponding competences to national constituent units as well as to the Union.163 It is true 
that EC law contains considerable amount references to the Constitutions of the Member 
States.164 It is still the consent of the Member States that gives EC law its existence and it 
does not have the life of its own without such consent. Simply the requirement for 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is not fulfilled by the European Union. It does not have a legal 
personality. Defence, foreign policy and internal affairs are still governed by Member 
States.165 As long as the EC/EU is competent to legislate, then the articles of the Treaty as a 
primary sources and the resultant legislation promulgated based on the legal basis provided 
under the Treaty have supremacy over national law in case of conflict. Therefore, a 
clarification of corresponding competences of the EC/EU and the Member States are 
necessary.  
 
The democratic deficit of Europe has long been a contentious issue and one of the reason the 
national courts have concerns regarding the fundamental rights protection at the European 
level. Due to this lack of democratic legitimacy, one can wonder why Member States (having 
emocratically elected parliaments enacting national laws) are not allowed to protect the 
fundamental rights under their respective Constitutions. It may be either the case that a piece 
 breach fundamental rights protected under the national 
d
of Community legislation may
                                                 
163 Kwiecień, supra note 27, pp. 1485. 
164 Wouters, supra note 41, pp. 33. 
165 Kumm, supra  note 148, pp. 368. 
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 Constitution or Community organs may exceed their competences and deal with issues under 
the competence of Members States (as defence issues described above) According to this 
logic, having the supreme law of land, Constitutional Courts must be allowed to exercise their 
jurisdictions stemming form their Constitutions.  
 
However, for matters that fall under the competence of the EC, where acts of institutions do 
not exceed the limits of their powers, the ECJ should take precedence over conflicting 
national measures. The insight provided concerning the competences and the conferral of 
competences reveals the limits of principle of supremacy. It is possible to conclude that there 
is a concurrent, a symbiotic type of existence of European legal system and national legal 
ystems.166 Under this European pluralist legal order (as opposed to the monist approach) 
2.2 The National Courts 
 
clined to accept the 
onist approach of the ECJ. Instead, they recognise a dualist view in which international law 
ple nd third chapters of this dissertation brought 
some case studies and emphasized this view of Member States, Germany, Hungary and 
                                                
s
there is no hierarchy between the European and national legal systems.167
 
Are the national courts barred from reviewing the constitutionality of secondary EC law?168 
In other words, the issue is whether EC law may be subject to constitutional review by the 
supreme Courts of the Member States. The national courts are not in
m
is im mented in national law. The second a
Poland. It was not the principle of supremacy at the centre of objection of the national courts. 
The national courts are aware of the fact that it is not possible as in the case of other 
international treaties to apply the principle of lex posterior derogat legi priori. The pragmatic 
 
166 Kwiecień, supra note 27, pp. 1484. 
167 Ibid., pp. 1485. 
168 Kumm, supra  note 148, pp. 352. 
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 approach of the ECJ for the efficacy and uniformity of EC law has been accepted also by the 
national courts. Instead the grounds for supremacy of Community law are contested. As 
discussed above, the hierarchy between the two legal systems is not accepted by the national 
courts. According to the dualist view, the grounds for supremacy for the national courts 
comes from the principle of observance of the international law in good faith, in other words, 
pacta sunt servanda or the principle of invocability of obligations arising from the 
international treaties that Member States signed. 
 
As a consequence of this view, the state organs including the national courts are required to 
apply Community law. The national legal acts cannot be rendered inapplicable automatically 
in case of conflict with Community law as it is necessary to revoke them according to the 
national procedures.169 This kind of protection of supremacy of national constitutional law 
can be seen in the stage of ratification of Treaties requiring the supremacy of EC law. The 
iscussion over the Accession Treaty of Poland is one of the examples of this protection. The d
Constitutional Court as a guardian of the Constitution is the final arbiter against the acts of the 
international organs and legislation of those organs that are in breach of the Constitution. 
Therefore, the limit for the supremacy of EC law is the Constitution. In Solange I this was the 
stand of the BVerfG: the refusal of the ECJ as the final arbiter. We have seen in the third 
chapter that to a certain extent Polish Constitutional Court only in its EAW judgment 
accepted that the absolute point of reference cannot be taken as the national Constitution 
where the issue is related to the secondary EC legislation. However, this “sympathetic 
interpretation” has shown its limits in the Polish Accession Treaty case.170
 
                                                 
 
169 Kwiecień, supra note 27, pp. 1488. 
0 Solange cases, supra note 3-4 and Polish Accession Treaty case, supra note 88, See also Kwiecień, supra 17
note 27, p. 1490. 
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 There are also criticisms against this dualist view. It may be the case that this line of thinking 
reduces the Rule of law to the national boundaries. EC law signifies an expansion of this Rule 
of law to the supranational sphere. Also, the argument of democratic legitimacy that is 
restricted to the nation-state.171
 
As indicated in this part of the chapter, the constitutional clash is the problem between the 
European legal order and national legal orders. We have seen the arguments of both sides and 
their respective solutions and the flaws in those solutions. The remainder of the chapter will 
focus on other alternative solutions that should be considered. 
3. METHODS PROPOSED TO OVERCOME THE CLASH 
 
Following the main headings of the debate from both sides above, it is possible to derive some 
possible solutions to the supremacy of EC law dispute. These are EC Law conform 
interpretation, Public International Law and European Constitutionalism. 
3.1 The principle of consistent interpretation in the light of EC Law 
 
The first way suggested is the principle of consistent interpretation of national law in the light 
of EC Law in order to ensure the efficacy and uniformity of Community law throughout the 
Union. This method applies more to the enforcement side of the debate on the principle of 
em erpreted in the light 
f EC law in a manner as to conform to the existing provisions of EC law. According to the 
                        
 
 
supr acy of EC law. It dictates that national laws and rules must be int
o
                         
171 Kumm, supra  note 148, pp. 370. 
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 established case law of the ECJ on the principle of consistent interpretation172, the national 
courts are responsible in realisation of their Community obligations.  
 
Under this principle, if there is a conflict between a rule of EC law and national law, they 
have to decide the case before them by interpreting the national law as far as possible in the 
lines with existing EC law. The immediate result is that EC takes precedence over the national 
provisions without undermining the status of the national constitutions and their applicability. 
owever, it does not provide the satisfactory solution as there is still discretion of national 
3.2 Public International Law 
 
Another solution offered by scholars is to draw an analogy between EC law and public 
international law. The existing general principles of international law that is already 
applicable to the relationship between the EC legal system and national legal systems can be 
s not provide explicit provisions regulating this relationship 
s in the case of absence of supremacy clause in the EC Treaty).  
treaty is determined at the 
rnational level 
                                                
H
court in its interpretation of national law in the light of EC law. 
 
used to the extent that EC law doe
(a
  
Under the general principles of international law, the European legal system and other 
national systems are considered as independent legal systems. The EC law is considered more 
of a system of international law than a supranational one. Therefore EC law should be 
transposed into national law and the effect of the international 
international level. In case of conflict the solution is also sought at the inte
 
172 Von Colson and Kamann, supra note 30 and Marleasing, supra note 31. See also Craig and  De Búrca, supra 
note 16, pp. 212-213. 
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 rather than before the national courts. Therefore, the enforcement mechanism of international 
law is weaker compared to the enforcement mechanism under the EC law where the 
authorities of the Member States can be effectively brought before the ECJ by the Community 
institutions. 
 
This approach conflicts with one of the basic principles of EC law, namely, uniform 
application of EC law throughout the Community. If the EC law is governed by the principles 
of international law whose principles are not as sophisticated as the EC system, Member 
States could easily evade and according to differing act of implementations of a same piece of 
C legislation would be shaped differently form one Member State to another. 
3.3 European Constitutionalism 
 
Kumm presented an alternative conception of Common European Constitutionalism as a 
midway solution to the principle of supremacy debate between the ECJ and the national 
courts.173 It relies on the very basic concept of constitution and secondly to the realization of 
 The aim is to achieve the uniform application of 
upranational rules. The Rule of Law will give predictability and regularity in the 
                                                
E
  
the Rule of Law at the European scale.
s
supranational level.174 This principle is indeed a reflection of the monist approach of the ECJ. 
The third principle linked to the ideal of having liberal-democratic governance though the 
institutionalisation of level of fundamental rights protection and democratic legitimacy.175 
Based on this principle, Kumm establishes a normative framework for the assessment of the 
doctrines concerning the solution of the debate between the ECJ and national courts. 
 
173 Kumm, supra  note 148, pp. 375. 
174 Ibid., pp. 375. 
175 Ibid., pp. 376. 
 86
 According to Kumm, “the best set of doctrines within a particular constitutional context at a 
particular time is the one that realizes these principles to the highest degree possible, all things 
considered.”176
Under this new framework, Kumm exemplifies the situation with the German Basic Law 
(GG) In terms of admissibility, for instance, under the terms of Article 100 GG jurisdiction of 
the court extents only to parliamentary laws enacted by German Parliament. The question is 
whether this jurisdiction also extends to acts of secondary EC legislation. From the 
perspective of the BVerfG, the legislative acts are directly applicable in Germany through 
e. Rather, it restricts the exercise as 
it accepts the development of an autonomous body of law in Europe. The acts of this new 
                       
legislative act of the Parliament laying down their direct applicability. According to the 
BVerfG this parliamentary act for which it has jurisdiction under Article 100 GG cannot 
allow establishment of law autonomous from it and undermines the legal protection of the 
BVerfG guaranteed by Article 100 GG. 
European Constitutionalist approach accepts the existence of the European Legal Order as an 
autonomous body of law in its own area and therefore it is applicable in Germany. The 
German Constitution did not restrict the BVerfG’s jurisdiction to parliamentary acts as that 
was the only one exercised on German territory at the tim
legal order are not subject to the review of the BVerfG. The legal basis for that principle can 
be found Article 23 GG and the Preamble which creates a commitment of establishing a 
“united Europe”. This requires that national courts should not interpret Article 100 GG so that 
it extends to acts of secondary EC legislation. If the guarantees of the ECJ for fundamental 
rights at the European level are not at sufficient level as the German Basic Law then the 
                          
176 Ibid. 
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 BVerfG could assert its jurisdiction over parliamentary acts implementing secondary EC 
legislation.177  
As it can be seen, this approach does not go much further from the BVerfG’s approach (the 
approach of national courts). It does not provide an answer to what would happen in the case 
where the EC Treaty articles are at issue or EC secondary legislation that has automatic direct 
applicability. Moreover, this approach is also problematic in the sense that the BVerfG can 
review the constitutionality of the rules of EC law under the circumstances where the 
h regard to 
the principle of supremacy, the ECJ follows a monist approach by asserting the existence of 
an autonomous European legal order and the necessity to ensure uniform and efficient 
eed, the very existence of EC law depends on the direct 
pplicability of the provisions of EC Treaties and other secondary legislation in the Member 
                                                
adequate protection of fundamental rights is not guaranteed at EC level. The problem with 
this approach is that conflicts with one of the tenets of his theory, namely uniformity of 
Community law. On the one hand he tries to achieve uniformity of European law.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter returned to the theoretical debate over the principle of supremacy. Wit
application of EC law. Ind
a
States and precedence of EC law over the national laws. Otherwise, without a proper 
supranational legal mechanism, the meaning of European integration and the commitment of 
states under the EC Treaties would have been meaningless. However, the Constitutional 
Courts of the Member States rely on the principle of pacta sunt servanda in explaining the 
supremacy of EC law: their constitutions authorize this supranational organization by giving 
 
177 Ibid., pp. 378. 
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 some of the competences that traditionally belong to the nation-state by surrendering some 
parts of their sovereignty and they just observe their commitments under the international law. 
There are, however, some solutions offered to eliminate this constitutional clash. However, 
none of the solutions provide an effective remedy. The experience with the BVerfG has 
shown that even if there was a learning experience between two legal systems, the clashes can 
occur. The effects of enlargement also have been felt in the centre of the debate. A political 
solution might be needed. The decision-making process and the institutions at the national and 
the European level might be aligned to each other so that national legislations would not be in 
conflict with EC Law. However, this is very complicated, time-consuming and inefficient 
method. The next chapter will turn to the Constitutional Treaty as an alternative solution. 
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 CHAPTE R V 
 THE TREATY ESTABLIS HING A CONSTI TUTION FOR EUROPE  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2001 the Laeken European Council the heads of state and government of the Member 
States of the European Union adopted the “Laeken Declaration on the future of Europe” in 
order to convene a “European Convention” to draw up a text amending the existing European 
Treaties. 
 
The preparation of the draft Constitution was a result of contributions of several institutions 
and of their deliberations under this Convention to which the representatives of the national 
parliaments, the European Parliament, the national governments and the Commission 
participated. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) adopted the result of the Convention to 
a major extent. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Hereinafter: TCE), 
commonly referred as the European Constitution was signed in 2004 by the representatives of 
the Member States. This can be accepted as one of the spectacular developments in the 
process of European integration. Although, with the subsequent French and Dutch referenda 
the future of the TCE is bleak, there are still expectations to revive the text. 
 
The main objective of the TCE is to replace a set of existing European Treaties which form 
the current European constitutional system under a single text; to codify the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and to streamline the decision-making mechanisms in European 
institutions. With its innovations such as new forms of legislative acts, its amendments in 
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 order decrease the democratic deficit that has been long been a debate in Europe and its 
introduction of “primacy of EC law” clause for the first time in the Treaty, the TCE can be 
regarded as one of the bold steps taken in the European integration process. The question 
remains is that whether Europe will achieve this unity (the uniform application of EC Law 
through the precedence of EC Law over the national laws) in diversity (in the concurrent 
existence of various national legal systems besides the EC legal order).178
 
This chapter mainly concentrates on the improvements that the TCE brings to the debate of 
supremacy in a broader perspective. It is true that for the first time the TCE specifically 
introduced a clause to decrease if not eliminate the clash between the ECJ and other national 
courts concerning supremacy of EC Law. Moreover, it brings a clear distinction concerning 
the competences of the Community vis-à-vis its Member States. It also provides mechanisms 
to level up the accountability and the legitimacy of the Union by introducing inventions to 
eliminate the democratic deficit problem.  
 
2. THE MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE TCE 
 
The main reason for the debate revolving around the principle supremacy of the ECJ law is 
that there is lack of trust in the national systems that their citizens are represented adequately 
in the European institutional mechanism and their fundamental rights are better addressed and 
protected by the national systems. The TCE brings certain mechanisms to ease this tension 
and to decrease the democratic deficit of the Community which is the main subject of this 
section. Part I of the TCE describes the values, objectives, decision-making procedures and 
                                                 
178 “Unity in Diversity” (In Varietate Concordia in Latin) has been adopted as the European motto by the 
Constitutional Treaty under Article 1-8 of the TCE. 
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 institutions of the European Union. It also includes a part concerning provisions on 
citizenship and democratic life. Part II includes the Charter for Fundamental Rights. Part III 
describes the policies, internal and external action and functioning of the EU. The main 
improvements of the TCE will be described under the following sections with a view to 
understand its contributions to the debate on supremacy of EC law. 
 
2.1 The TCE provides a single foundation for the Union with revised principles and 
includes the Charter for Fundamental Rights  
 
Under the existing system, the EU is governed by several founding treaties and their 
amendments. These are three original Treaties founding the European Communities (the 
ECSC (1951), the EURATOM (1957) and the EEC(1957)) and fourth founding treaty, the 
Treaty of Maastricht (1992) establishing the European Union. The TCE replaces the existing 
European Communities and the European Union and other treaties amending and 
supplementing them such as the Merger Treaty (1965), the Single European Act (1986), the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and Treaty of Nice (2001). As a result there will be a single text 
comprising all these Treaties. Moreover, the European Union will be a single legal personality 
under the terms of Article I-7 of the TCE. 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht introduced a three-pillar structure with the establishment of the 
European Union: the Community pillar comprising the three Community Treaties, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
pillar. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam some activities governed under the JHA were 
transferred to Community pillar. The Community pillar has a supranational character whereas 
due to the delicacy of the issues dealt under the second and the third pillar, these retain their 
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 intergovernmental nature. The TCE therefore merges these there pillars although special 
procedures are still applicable under the second pillar for foreign policy, security and 
defence.179 An exit clause is also provided under the TCE that permit Member States to leave 
the Union. 
 
From the legal perspective, the TCE is a treaty and therefore it needs to be ratified according 
to the procedures applicable in the Member States. Currently, the TCE failed in the French 
and Dutch referenda. Had it been ratified it would enter into force in November 1, 2006. As of 
May 2006, the following states Member States ratified the TCE: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain. The possible future of the TCE will be discussed in the last section.  
 
Another significant input of the TCE is the inclusion of the Charter for Fundamental Rights 
into the Constitution. Under Title II referred as “Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the 
Union” Article I-9 provides that “the Union shall recognize the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II.” Above all, 
it provides for the Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
This provides a concrete basis in the TCE for the protection of fundamental rights in the EU 
legal order.  
 
This inclusion should be welcomed in the face of debates between the ECJ and the national 
courts180 on the fundamental rights since the Member States had long claimed that the 
standard of protection for human rights in the Community was not equivalent to that of 
national systems as it has been stated in previous chapters of this dissertation. It is of use now 
                                                 
179 The Constitutional Treaty –Key Elements, Euractiv http://www.euractiv.com/en/constitution/constitutional-
treaty-key-elements/article-128513 
180 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 49, para 13. 
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 to turn back briefly to this debate on the protection of fundamental rights and the evolution of 
the case law of the ECJ to reveal its close link with the debate on principle of supremacy of 
EC Law. 
 
As a response to the claims, at the beginning the ECJ claimed the contrary asserting that the 
Community has the same level of protection and used to reiterate the statements in its 
judgments such as; 
 
In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general 
principles of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such 
rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of 
the Community.181
 
This is closely linked with the debate on supremacy of EC Law as the ECJ asserted that the 
existing system in the Community for the protection of fundamental rights was adequate and 
therefore, there was no ground for a Member State to question the validity of a Community 
measure (such as a secondary EC legislation with a higher rank, a regulation) by proclaiming 
that it runs contrary to fundamental rights as formulated under its national Constitution. The 
reason is that the EC law takes precedence over such conflicting national legislation. 
 
Overtime, the ECJ has come to accept the existence of other international treaties. In Nold v. 
Commission: 
 
                                                 
181 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 49, para. 4 
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 In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore 
uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized 
and protected by the Constitutions of those States. 
 
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law. 
 
In the Omega case for instance, the ECJ outspokenly added to this that182 “the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has special significance in that 
respect.” Finally, this recognition was included in Article I-9 of the TCE.  
 
As a result two major changes are expected to occur: the ECJ will have a codified catalogue 
of fundamental rights and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights183 will 
expressly cover the Union.184 Under this new structure, the European Court of Human Rights 
continues to review the complaints about domestic authorities. This may also include the 
cases that are brought against the domestic authorities which are simply implementing the 
national legislation that was adopted in order to implement Community legislation. In these 
cases the Community legislation may infringe upon the fundamental rights as protected under 
                                                 
182 Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn ECR 2004 P I-09609.
183 European Court of Human Rights is located at Strasbourg and is one of the institutions of the Council of 
Europe which is outside the institutional framework of the EC. 
184 Rick Lawson, The Impact of th European Constitution on the Relationship between Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg, Contribution to the Proceedings Asser Institute Colloquium on European Law, The Hague, 
October 2004, The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? 
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 ECHR.185 With the accession of the European Union to the ECHR, now it is possible for the 
European Court of Human Rights to address the alleged violations by the institutions of the 
European Union. At the same time, the ECJ will continue to review the complaints about the 
European institutions (based on the legislative acts they issued for instance). In the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the Nold cases, the ECJ asserted to do so. Indeed, in 
its recent decisions such as particularly the Baustahlgewebe186 for the first time the ECJ ruled 
that there is a Community violation of fundamental rights. With the inclusion of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights the Community will have all the means to do so. The Charter indeed 
comprises a catalogue of wide variety of rights ranging from civil, political, economic, 
cultural and social rights including very innovative rights such as right to good administration. 
It is also striking that now it is possible for the ECJ to examine the compliance of the Member 
States of the fundamental rights protected by the EU as a matter of EU law. In conclusion, as 
a result of the inclusion of the TCE of the Charter for fundamental rights “human rights 
protection profile” of the EU will enhance. Therefore, it is possible to expect less cases 
alleging that a Community measure is in conflict with basic fundamental rights protected 
under the national constitution as it is now also possible for the ECJ to take action against 
such act of the Community institutions or even further against a Member State that is in 
breach of its obligations to protect fundamental rights arising from the TCE. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
185 Such as protection of property. The European Court of Human Rights case EctHR, 13 Sept 2001, Bosphorus 
Airways v. Ireland (Appl. No. 45036/98) where the ECJ refused the claims under the same case Case- 85/95, 
Bosphorus [1996] ECR I-3953. 
186 Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe [1998] ECR I-8417. 
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 2.2  The TCE simplifies and changes the institutional framework 
 
Title IV brings several changes in the institutional structure of the Union. The TCE attempts 
to simplify the legal instruments that are used in order to fulfil the objectives of the Union. 
One of the improvements that the TCE brings is the unification of legal instruments across the 
policy areas. To this end, the number of instruments which is currently 15 will be also 
reduced to 6. These are specified as European laws and European framework laws (legislative 
acts), European regulations and European decisions (implementing acts), recommendations 
and opinions (non-binding acts).  
 
According to this, a European Law (which denotes to the EC Regulation or the PJC187 
Decision previously) will be a legislative act having general application. It is binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. A European framework law (which 
denotes to the EC Directive or the PJC Framework Decision previously) is binding as to the 
results to be achieved, addresses the Member States and leaves the choice of the form and 
methods. The PJC Conventions are replaced by either European laws or European framework 
laws. A European Decision replaces Joint actions and Common Positions under CFSP and it 
is a non-legislative act though having a binding character where it specifies those to whom it 
is addressed and is binding on them. Recommendations and opinions are set to be non-binding 
again.188
 
As far as the decision making-procedures concerned, the qualified majority voting (QMV) is 
defined as 55 percent of the Member States representing at least 65% of the EU’s population 
                                                 
187 The Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs pillar (JHA) under the Maastricht Treaty was renamed in 
Amsterdam Treaty as Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJC). 
188 Simplified jargon and legal instruments 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_constitution#Simplified_jargon_and_legal_instruments 
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 under the Article I-25. This mechanism is accompanied by two further arrangements. First, 
the mechanism tries to prevent a situation where only three large Member States would be 
able to block a Council decision due to increase in population threshold. Therefore, to form a 
blocking minority would need to gather at least four Member States. Furthermore, the 
mechanisms are devised in order to have a broader consensus basis within the Council by 
allowing at least three-quarters of a blocking minority to ask for vote to be postponed.  
 
Unanimity still remains a rule in the areas such as taxation and partially to other policy areas 
such as social policy, foreign, security and defence policy. 
 
The TCE also specifies the roles of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission. The TCE specifically spells out the missions of the Commission under Article I-
26 such as its monopoly in legislative initiation process, its executive function and its function 
of representing the Union externally in CFSP. The Commission is also located at the position 
under the TCE for the initiation of inter-institutional programming. 
 
Another development in the institutional structure is the creation of the post of the Union 
Minister of Foreign Affairs who is going to be responsible for the representation of the Union. 
Article I-28 defines the tasks of this new post. According to this, this task will be the 
combination of the task of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy with those of the Commissioner for acting on behalf of the Community for external 
relations. This Minister of Foreign Affairs will be in charge of CFSP under the mandate of the 
Council and at the same time will be a full member of the Commission. This will increase the 
political accountability aspect of the Union vis-à-vis the European citizen and is a positive 
development as far as the democratic deficit debates are concerned.  
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The TEC also establishes the European Council as a distinct institution of the Union than the 
Council of Ministers. It will be chaired by a President appointed for two and a half years with 
renewable terms. The presidency of the different Council formations will continue on equal 
basis. This will assure the continuity in administration. 
 
Composition of institutions also changed. The maximum number of seats in the European 
Parliament is increased to 750 and for each Member State the minimum number will be 
minimum 6 and maximum 96 seats. The existing composition of the Commission (one 
Commissioner per Member State) will be altered by the year 2014. 
 
2.3 The TCE specifies the competences of the Community and updates the third pillar 
while rewriting the second pillar 
 
As opposed to other Treaties the TCE did not bring major changes concerning the 
competences of the Community to a large extent. The TCE significantly updates the 
provisions under the JHA in order to facilitate the establishment of the area of freedom, 
security and justice. In many of the situations the decision-making mechanism is set as QMV. 
There is no major change concerning the provisions of external relations. 
 
The competences of the Community are clearly defined under Title III. According to this the 
areas of exclusive competences of the Union are; 
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 a) Customs union; 
b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market; 
c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro 
d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy 
e) common commercial policy 
 
The areas under the shared competence of the Union and the Member States are; 
a) internal market; 
b) social policy, for the aspects defined in Part III of the TCE; 
c) economic, social and territorial cohesion; 
d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; 
e) environment; 
f) consumer protection; 
g) transport; 
h) trans-European networks; 
i) energy; 
j) area of freedom, security and justice; 
k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined under the 
Part II of the TCE. 
 
The delimitation of these competences facilitates the use of the principle of subsidiarity by the 
Member States to make sure that the Union will not act out of its competences and the 
tensions concerning the supremacy of the Union law for the areas falls under its exclusive 
competence, the Union will exercise its supremacy over the law of the Member States. 
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 2.4 The TCE brings more democracy, transparency and efficiency 
 
The democratic legitimacy of the decision-making in the EC has been always one of the 
contentious issues. The problem of democratic deficit denoted to unresponsiveness of the 
Community institutions to the “democratic pressure”.189 Under the national systems, the 
decision makers act under such pressure knowing that they are politically accountable of their 
decisions and act according to the demand of the society in order to survive in the elections. 
Despite its supranational character in certain areas which empowers the Community to take 
action on behalf of the European citizens, some of the important institutions of the EC are not 
directly elected by the citizens such as the such as the Commission which occupies a 
significant place in the decision-making structure as the initiator of the legislative acts. 
Although the European Parliament exists as an elected body, its representation in the 
decision-making mechanism is limited to certain areas specified under the Treaty despite 
recent improvement through co-decision procedure. Another aspect is the distance to the 
citizens. As the areas of competences enlarges the matters become more distant to the 
citizens. Moreover the complexity of the decision-making in the Union further decreases the 
transparency of the process and makes it difficult for outsiders to understand what is going on 
in the decision-making process. 
 
The TCE addresses this democratic deficit issue in a number of areas and certain 
arrangements are made in order to increase democracy, transparency and accountability of the 
EU institutions. For instance, the TCE provides that if enough number of signatures are 
collected (one million) European citizens can invite the Commission to submit an appropriate 
proposal and initiate legislative act in that matter. Moreover, during the exercise of its 
                                                 
189 Craig and De Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 167. 
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 legislative function, the proceedings of the Council will be open to public. The simplifications 
in the legislative acts and decision-making procedures under the TCE further aims to decrease 
this democratic deficit. Furthermore, national parliaments will be informed about all the new 
initiatives of the Commission and if there are questions that the proposal does not comply 
with the subsidiarity principle (one third of the Member States Parliaments) then the 
Commission has to review its proposal. Finally, the inclusion of the Charter for fundamental 
rights means that a better protection will be provided under the Union. 
 
2.5 The supremacy of the Union Law clause is included 
 
All these above-mentioned new innovations of the TCE have positive reflections to the debate 
concerning the supremacy of EC law either by increasing the level of protection of 
fundamental rights, by clearly delimiting the competences of the community, by simplifying 
the decision-making procedures or by decreasing the democratic deficit of the Community. 
The TCE brings even more. It includes a clause (Article I-6) clearly stipulating that “the 
Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences 
conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.” The TCE introduces 
for the first time such a “supremacy clause” into a Community treaty. After all, since its early 
decisions such as Costa v. ENEL190 the ECJ has established a case-law and the supremacy of 
EC law became one of the general principles of EC law. It is more than a mere codification of 
the existing case-law of the ECJ. From the legal point of view, the Union now can simply rely 
on a primary source of EU law to found its claims of supremacy of EU law not the its case-
law. The rulings of the ECJ, therefore, become more legitimate and well-grounded. The TCE 
provides that supremacy of EC law has a legal basis in the Constitution.  
                                                 
190 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, supra note 29. 
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 3.  CONCLUSION 
 
The TCE introduces many innovations in several areas under the Union law. It provides 
greater transparency, democracy and less complexity in decision-making procedures. In that 
regard, the TCE is “bringing Europe closer to its citizens”. It also replaces the existing 
Treaties and provides a single legal text. The inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the possibility of the accession of the Union to the ECHR are remarkable improvements 
in the area of protection of fundamental rights. This will increase the level of protection of 
fundamental rights within the Union and the concerns of the some Constitutional Courts of 
the Member States (such as the BVerfG or the Hungarian Constitutional Court) will be eased. 
The clear delimitation of competences also facilitates that who is the final arbiter in which 
area. Thus, for the matters that fall under the Community competence the Union law will take 
precedence under the Article I-6 of the TCE. Although the TCE failed during the French and 
the Dutch referenda, there are certain opinions to save the text. One way suggested is to 
convince the opponents and save the text in its entirety. An alternative way is to re-draft the 
text again. Considering the time and efforts spent in the Convention and IGC, the first method 
is more effective in order to save what has been achieved so far.191 However, the second way 
is more plausible in the face of increasing number of opponents of further European 
integration. Whichever the result will be the EU has to wait for some more time to settle the 
dispute over the supremacy of EC Law till the adoption of the TCE clarifying many matters 
that contributed to the debate. 
                                                 
191 Debate about future possibilities for the Constitution 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_constitution#Debate_about_future_possibilities_for_the_Constitution 
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 GENERAL CONCLUDI NG REMARKS 
 
The legal system that has been established with the European Integration process under the 
supervision of the ECJ is one of the most efficient international legal systems. The 
supranational nature of the European Communities necessitated this legal system to be 
founded on principles that distinguish the EC legal system from other international 
mechanisms. It is something more than the general principles international law but principle 
of supremacy that ensures assent of the Member States to their obligations enshrined under 
the Treaty and the secondary EC legislation. Thus, EC law takes precedence over conflicting 
national legislations in order to provide uniformity and efficacy of the Community law 
throughout the Union. It is the first chapter of this dissertation that focuses on this monist 
approach of the ECJ. 
 
The second chapter tackles the debate from another perspective, from the viewpoint of the 
national Constitutional Courts. The constitutional clash between the two legal systems 
generally occurs due to dualist legal systems that require the transposition of the international 
law into municipal law through national legislative acts. The German legal system and the 
jurisprudence of the BVerfG is one of the outstanding examples of this debate. This 
relationship between the BVerfG and the ECJ has reached to a certain maturity through the 
learning process since the ECJ’s ruling in Internationale Handelsgesselshaft. As a result of 
this process the BVerfG decided not to use its jurisdiction for constitutional review of the 
secondary legislation of the Community if certain level of protection for the fundamental 
rights as in the German system was ensured by EC Law. In Bananas judgment, the BVerfG 
strictly defined its jurisdiction on the secondary EC Law.  
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 The third chapter attempted to demonstrate that this may not be the end of the debate. The 
jurisdiction of the ECJ and its well established principle of supremacy is under attack. Not 
only that the BVerfG can decide to use its emergency competence for certain rights protected 
by the Constitution if a secondary EC legislation conflicts with it (under the third pillar) but 
also the similar tensions can occur in the courts of new Member States. The Hungarian and 
Polish Constitutional Courts have given the very first signals in that direction. Those countries 
had to adopt the acquis communautaire before their accession and thereby recognizing that 
EC Law not only binding but also takes precedence over their national laws. However, as in 
the German example, sometimes citing from the decisions of BVerfG in the national 
judgments, by warning the ECJ of the limits of its competences, the newly set up 
Constitutional Courts of the new Member States asserted that they are the definitive guardians 
of national sovereignty and the Constitution of their land. Even in the countries where the 
transition (during the accession debates) was smooth such as Poland, it is possible to trace the 
same tension with the ECJ.  
 
The fourth chapter turns back to the very question that whether there is a way to ensure 
rapprochement between the ECJ and the Constitutional Courts of Member States. If not, 
whether there is a way to overcome those conflicting approaches. In this dissertation several 
ways have been proposed to reach this rapprochement including applying only existing EC 
Law conform interpretation, recourse to public international law principles, finding a mid-way 
with European constitutionalism. However, these alternative ways do not provide a 
satisfactory solution.  
 
The last chapter analyses its various innovations under the TCE and suggests that this is the 
best possible way to address this clash between the two legal systems. Apart from its 
 105
 introduction of the supremacy clause, TCE provides various means to transcend this problem 
through increasing the democratic accountability of the Community, increasing the level of 
standards for the protection of fundamental rights, clarifying the competences and simplifying 
the decision-making mechanisms. After all, it is apparent that the problem is not the question 
that which legal system superior over the other but the interaction between these legal systems 
due to their mandatory co-existence.192 The TCE provides the means that governs this 
interaction in a better way if not perfect. 
 
 
 
                                                 
192 N. MacCormick, “Questioning Sovereigty” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 117-21. 
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